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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over formal administrative proceedings of the
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-613(7),
§ 630-4-403(1), § 78A-4-103(2)(a), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

f

Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

As a matter oflaw, did the Hearing Officer correctly rule that Public Employees'
Health Program ("PEHP") properly paid life insurance proceeds according to Utah
law and the PEHP Life Master Policy?

2.

As a matter of equity, should PEHP be required to pay life insurance benefits
twice on the same policy when Ms. Welty and Mr. Lopez waited six years to bring
a claim?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has said, "We review the Board's application or interpretation of a
statute as a question of law under the correction-of-error standard." Bhatia v. Ret. Bd.,

Long-Term Disability Program, 2013 UT App 103, ,r 5,302 P.3d 140 (quoting McLeod v.
Ret. Bd., 2011 UT App 190, ,r 9,257 P.3d 1090).
In addition, "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic
evidence are matters oflaw, and on such questions we accord [the Board's] interpretation
no presumption of correctness." Gee v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 842 P.2d 919,920 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (citation omitted).

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-609(2) (emphasis added):
The most recent beneficiary designations signed by the
member and filed with the office [PEHP], including
electronic records, at the time of the member's death are
binding in the payment of any benefits due under this title.

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-610(1) (emphasis added):
(a) Any benefits payable to a beneficiary shall be made in the
name of and delivered to the beneficiary ....

(d) The total of the payments made under this section shall
fully discharge and release the office [PEHPJ from any
further claims.

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-20-105(1) (emphasis added):
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a mechanism
for covered employers to provide covered individuals with
group health, dental, medical, disability, life insurance,
medicare supplement, conversion coverage, cafeteria, flex
plan, and other programs requested by the state, its political
subdivisions, or educational institutions in the most efficient
and economical manner.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act
("Retirement Act" or "Act"), found in Title 49 of the Utah Code, in order to provide a
comprehensive system of retirement and health insurance benefits to state and local
public employees throughout the State of Utah. In order to administer the benefit
programs in a consistent and uniform way, the Legislature created within the Retirement
2

Act an administrative office-the Utah State Retirement Office, also known as the Utah
Retirement Systems (the "Retirement Office" or "URS"), and a governing body-the
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board"). See Utah Code Ann.§§ 49-11-201, -202.
In addition, Chapter 11 of the Act provides general provisions which govern all
systems, plans and programs administered by the Retirement Office. Sections 49-11-609
and -610 specifically govern the distribution of payments to beneficiaries. See Utah Code
Ann. § 49-11-10 I et seq. Chapter 20 of the Act, known as the Public Employees' Benefit
and Insurance Program Act, creates a program allowing self-insured insurance benefits
for public employees. See id. § 49-20-101, -103, -105, and-401(l)(a). The Public
Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program, known as the Public Employees' Health
Program ("PEHP"), a program within the Utah State Retirement Office, administers these
statutory insurance benefits. See id. § 49-20-103. The statute provides, "The purpose of
i)

this chapter is to provide a mechanism for covered employers to provide covered
individuals with group health, dental, medical, disability, life insurance, medicare
supplement, conversion coverage, cafeteria, flex plan, and other programs requested by
the state, its political subdivisions, or educational institutions in the most efficient and

economical manner." Id.§ 49-20-105(1) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this statutory
authority, the PEHP Group Term Life Program (referred to herein as "PEHP")
administers the life insurance benefits that are the subject of this dispute. See id. § 49-20103.
Appellant Diane Welty ("Ms. Welty") is the ex-wife of Jesse Gavino Lopez ("Mr.
Lopez"), and Appellant Jacob Lopez ("Jacob") is the son of Mr. Lopez (Ms. Welty and
3

Jacob collectively referred to as "the Weltys"). R. 108-09. Mr. Lopez was employed by
Salt Lake City Corporation ("City") and was covered by a group term life insurance
policy offered to City employees through PEHP at the time of his death on July 9, 2006.
R. 108.
On the date of his death, July 9, 2006, Mr. Lopez was still an active employee of
the City and had life insurance coverage with PEHP in the amount of $173,000.00. R.
177. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Claimant's Statement from Mr. Lopez's
designated beneficiary, Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife. R. 197. At that time, PEHP
received no other claims to Mr. Lopez's life insurance proceeds. R. 243-45. On or about
August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in the amount of $173,000.00 to Mary Ellen Lopez,
the beneficiary designated on the Group Term Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary Change
Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006 ("2006 Beneficiary Change
Form"). R. 243-44.
It was not until nearly six years later, on or about May 1, 2012, that PEHP
received notice that a claim was being made by the Weltys for Mr. Lopez's life insurance
proceeds, by virtue of a summons and complaint to PEHP in Third District Court to
recover the claimed life insurance proceeds. R. 246. In addition to PEHP and URS, the
complaint also named as a defendant Mary Ellen Lopez, the named beneficiary who
received the proceeds at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. Id. On September 19, 2012, the
action brought in Third District Court was dismissed as to PEHP and URS because the
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against PEHP and URS. Id.
Upon information and belief, the action was later dismissed as against Mary Ellen Lopez.
4

See Case History, Welty v. Lopez, Case No. 120902041, dated Dec. 8, 2014, attached
(i)

hereto as Appellee' s Addendum F.
Not until August 28, 2012, did the Weltys submit a Notice of Claim to PEHP for
the death of Mr. Lopez. R. 245. On December 4, 2012, the PEHP Life Claims Review
Committee sent a letter denying the claim because PEHP properly paid the life insurance
proceeds to the beneficiary listed at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. R. 214-15. On
February 8, 2013, the Weltys appealed to the Executive Director of URS and requested
that he reconsider the decision made by the PEHP Life Claims Review Committee. R.
217-19. On February 28, 2013, the URS Executive Director sent a letter denying
Appellants' appeal because he determined that PEHP had correctly paid the benefits to
the named beneficiary at the time of death under the terms of the PEHP Group Term Life
& Group Accident Master Policy ("PEHP Life Master Policy'' or "Master Policy"). R.

@

221-22.
The Weltys filed a Request for Board Action to appeal the Executive Director's
decision on or about April 4, 2013. R. 28. They later amended the Request. R. 102-03.
Ultimately, the Board's Adjudicative Hearing Officer heard the matter on July 16, 2015,
and ruled in favor of PEHP. R. 239, 289-98. The Board subsequently adopted the
Hearing Officer's ruling. R. 297.
The Weltys thereafter appealed the Board's final action to this Court.

5

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
Statement of Stipulated Facts

lij

The Parties stipulated to the following facts in writing before the Board:
1.

Jesse Gavino Lopez ("Mr. Lopez") was employed by Salt
Lake City Corporation ("City") and was covered by a group
term life insurance policy offered to City employees through
the Public Employees' Health Program ("PEHP") Life
Program.

2.

Mr. Lopez, and petitioner, Diane Welty ("Ms. Welty") were
married in August 1978 and divorced in October 1997.

3.

On October 29, 1997, a Decree of Divorce was ordered by
rd
Judge Pat B. Brian of the 3 District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah.

@)

@

@
4.

In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as follows:
24. That the Respondent currently has in force and effect a
life insurance policy on his life in the face amount of
$325,000.00. That Respondent is ordered to maintain in full
force and effect said life insurance policy until such time as
the last of the parties' children reaches age 18 or alimony
terminates, whichever is later. During the period that the
child support is due, the Respondent should be ordered to
irrevocably designate the Petitioner, as trustee for the minor
children, beneficiary on said life insurance policy. The
Respondent should be ordered to provide the Petitioner with
proof that the insurance is in effect within 30 days of entry of
the Divorce Decree and providing verification that said
insurance is in effect by January 15 th of each year thereafter.

~

~

@

5.

In July 1999, Mr. Lopez had coverage of $173,000.00 with
the Life Program, of which $50,000.00 was funded by the
City and the rest funded by Mr. Lopez.

6.

On December 3, 1999, PEHP received a Group Term Life
Application from Mr. Lopez dated on or about November 29,
1999. The application indicated that Mr. Lopez was applying

@

6
@

for $300,000.00 in Basic Group Term Life Coverage. The
application named Diane (petitioner) for minor children as
per attached divorce decree and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as
secondary beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's request for additional
coverage was cancelled in December 1999 based upon
contact from the City's Human Resources Department.

@)

@

7.

On December 3, 1999 the Life Program received a
Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on November
29, 1999, which listed Petitioner, "Diane (petitioner) for
minor children as per attached divorce decree" as primary
beneficiary and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary
beneficiary.

8.

The Life Program received a written copy of the Decree of
Divorce entered by the Third District of the State of Utah on
October 29, 1997 attached to the Beneficiary Change Form
submitted by Mr. Lopez on or about December 3, 1999.

9.

In a Verified Response to Petitioner's Order to Show Cause
signed by Mr. Lopez on December 6, 1999, Mr. Lopez
provided. the following:
a. On or about the 3 1st day of October, 1997 this Court
entered a Decree of Divorce based upon the entry of
Respondent's default.
b. The Decree of Divorce contained a number of
misstatements of fact, some even inconsistent with the
terms of the Petition from which the default was taken.
Respondent was not provided with a copy of the Decree of
Divorce until long after the time to set the default had
expired under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.
C. In reality Respondent never had a life insurance policy on
his life with a face amount of $325,000.00.
d. At the time of divorce Respondent owned two policies.
The first was a basic term policy offered through his
employment for approximately $100,000. The second was
a universal life insurance policy offered through Allstate
Insurance which insured his life for only $50,000.00, and
which also insured the life of Petitioner for $50,000.00.
Thus, Respondent's factual burden to carry insurance has
always been approximately $150,000.00.

7

10.

11.

12.

13.

On July 24, 2003, the Life Program received an Additional Group
Term Life Employee Enrollment Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or
about July 15, 2003. Mr. Lopez applied for additional coverage up
to $300,000. The designated primary beneficiary was Petitioner
Diane Lopez, his ex-wife[,] for minor child $300,000 per divorce
decree and his son Petitioner Jacob Lopez as contingent beneficiary.
This beneficiary change form also reflects Jacob Lopez's date of
birth as August 27, 1988. However, Mr. Lopez did not complete
underwriting requirements, and he was never issued the additional
coverage.
In addition to the Additional Group Term Life Employee Enrollment
Form on July 24, 2003, PEHP received a Beneficiary Change Form
signed on or about July 15, 2003, by Mr. Lopez. The form revoked
any previous nominations of beneficiary(ies) and designated Mary
Ellen Lopez his wife and his ex-wife Diane Lopez petitioner for
minor child as primary beneficiaries.
On October 24, 2003, PEHP received a Group Term Life Change
Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about October 21, 2003. The form
stated in relevant part: "Revoking any previous nomination or
beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the following individuals to
receive all benefits payable upon my death." Mr. Lopez designated
Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife, as primary beneficiary and Joshua G.
Lopez, his son, as contingent beneficiary.
On March 20, 2006, PEHP received a Group Term Life/Accident
Plan Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about
March 13, 2006. The form stated in relevant part: "Revoking any
previous nomination or beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the
following individuals to receive all benefits payable upon my death."
Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as primary
beneficiary.

14.

Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006.

15.

Jacob Lopez was 17 years old at the time of Mr. Lopez's death.

16.

On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Group Term Life Program
Claimant's Statement from Mary Ellen Lopez.

17.

On or about August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in the amount of
$173,000.00 to Mary Ellen Lopez, the beneficiary designated on the

@

@)
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~

@

@
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Group Term Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary Change Form signed by
Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006.

®

18.

The Life Program Group Term Life Master Policy ("Master Policy")
is the contract between the Life Program and its covered members.

19.

The Master Policy states:
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
If a Subscriber and/or Dependent dies, the Plan will pay to the
beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth herein, the
amount of coverage for which the Subscriber and/or
Dependent is covered.

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. . . . Any
payment made in good faith pursuant to this provision fully
discharges the Plan to the extent of the payment.

BENEFICIARY
A subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary and a
contingent beneficiary at the time of application for coverage.
A subscriber may change his or her beneficiary(ies) by filing
a written notice of the change with the Plan. The change will
take effect as [of] the date the Subscriber signed the notice of
change .... Any payment made by the Plan in good faith
pursuant to this provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the
extent of such payment.

MODIFICATION
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless
approved by the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced
by endorsement or amendment to this Master Policy. No
agent has authority to change this Master Policy or waive any
of its provisions.

NOTICE OF CLAIM
A written notice of claim must be given to the Plan within
(20) days after the death of a Subscriber and/or Dependent
9

unless it was not reasonably possible to do so. Notice given
by or on behalf of a Subscriber and/or Dependent or his
beneficiary if any, to the Plan at its office in Salt Lake City,
Utah, with information sufficient to identify the Subscriber
and/or Dependent, shall be deemed notice to the Plan.

TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as reasonably
possible after receipts of an acceptable written proof of loss
together with all supporting materials ....

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. If any
payment remains unpaid at the death of the beneficiary, or if
the beneficiary is a minor or is, in the opinion of the Plan,
legally incapable of giving a valid receipt and discharge for
any payment, the Plan, at its option, may pay such benefit to
any relative or relatives by blood or connection by marriage
of the Subscriber and/or Dependent who is deemed by the
Plan to be equitably and legally entitled to receive the
payment. Any payment made in good faith pursuant to this
provision fully discharges the Plan to the extent of the
payment. ...

LEGAL ACTION
No legal action may be brought against the Plan for unpaid
benefits until at least sixty (60) days after written proof of
loss has been furnished in accordance with the requirements
stated above. No legal action may be brought after the
expiration of three years after the time written proof of loss is
required to be furnished.
@

ENTIRE CONTRACT
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the written
statements, if any, of Subscribers, constitute the entire
contract.
20.

On August 28, 2012, Petitioner, Ms. Welty submitted a notice
of claim to the Life Program in which she presented a dispute
10

regarding the distribution of Mr. Lopez's life insurance
coverage.
(i)

@

21.

Ms. Welty indicated that Mr. Lopez had a life insurance
policy with Allstate Life Insurance in the amount of
$300,000.00 on or about October 29, 1997.

22.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-618, "All data in the
possession of the office is confidential, and may not be
divulged by the office except as permitted by board action."
Petitioners were not, and could not be, supplied with
beneficiary designation information until they brought this
request for board action.

23.

On or about May 1, 2012, Diane Welty and Jacob Lopez
served a summons and complaint to Utah Retirement Services
and PEHP in Third District Court to recover life insurance
proceeds paid by PEHP through the Group Term Life Plan to
Mary Ellen Lopez the designated beneficiary of Mr. Lopez.
Mary Ellen Lopez was also named as a Defendant in this
action.

24.

On September 19, 2012, the action brought in Third District
Court against PEHP was dismissed without adjudication
because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims against PEHP. In a Declaration submitted in the Third
District Court, Petitioner, Ms. Welty indicated the following:
"1. Shortly after the death ofmy ex-husband, Mr. Lopez, I
contacted Mrs. Lopez regarding the life insurance proceeds
for my minor son, Jacob Lopez. 2. Mrs. Lopez told me that
she had discussed the issue with her attorney, and that she did
not have to pay any money to Jacob, but merely had to list
Jacob on the title to her condo."

25.

Petitioners filed an Amended Request for Board Action on
April 5, 2013.

26.

On September 3, 2013, Respondents waived all arguments
relating to barring claims pursuant to an applicable statute of
limitations.

W)

@)

ti@

(j

®

@

R. 240-48.
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Clarifications to Appellants' Statement of Additional Facts
Appellants' Fact #1: Petitioners had power to determine that a submitted change

@

of beneficiary form is invalid. Appellants' Br., at 17.

Board's Response: First, PEHP specifically rejects any notion that Petitioners the
Weltys had power to determine a change of beneficiary form is invalid. However, even
presuming the Weltys meant "Respondent" PEHP instead of "Petitioners," by law and
contract, PEHP was bound to pay the last properly designated beneficiary. As a matter of
practice, if the beneficiary form was unclear as to the insured's intent based on the form,
such as if beneficiary designation was not signed by the insured, PEHP may ask for
further clarification as to intended beneficiary. R. 299, HT, at 28:3-12; 30:4-8. However,
PEHP does not have the authority under law to completely disregard a facially valid
beneficiary designation form. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-609.

Appellants' Fact #2: Jacob Lopez has taken out student loans to fund his college
education. Appellants' Br., at 17.

Board's Response: PEHP does not have sufficient information to either confirm
or deny this assertion, but for purposes of this appeal does not dispute it. Nothing in the
record indicates that Jacob Lopez relied in any way on the PEHP life insurance in
obtaining student loans.

Appellants' Fact #3: Ms. Welty filed a motion for an order to show cause against
Mr. Lopez related to the requirement that he carry life insurance and irrevocably
designate Ms. Welty as a beneficiary.

12

0

Board's Response: PEHP was not a party to this action, but for purposes of this
(i;

appeal does not dispute this fact.

Statement of Additional Relevant Facts

1. The Weltys were aware of Mr. Lopez's passing at or near the time of his death.
R. 300, Respt. 's Hr' g Ex. M, iJiJ 1-2.
2. The Weltys were aware at or near the time of Mr. Lopez's death of his
obligation under the October 29, 1997 decree of divorce ("Divorce Decree") to
maintain life insurance coverage on behalf of Jacob. Id.
3. The Weltys were aware at or near the time of Mr. Lopez's death that the
Divorce Decree discussed an obligation to maintain Ms. Welty as the
beneficiary of his life insurance. Id.; see also R. 123, 125-35.
4. Ms. Welty spoke to Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez just after Mr. Lopez's death about
her belief that the Mr. Lopez's PEHP life insurance benefits ought to be paid to
Jacob. Upon information and belief, Mrs. Mary Ellen Lopez told Ms. Welty
that instead of paying the benefits, she would list Jacob on the title to Mr.
Lopez's condo. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. M, ifil 1-2.
5. The Weltys failed to file a claim with PEHP for Mr. Lopez's life insurance
benefits until roughly six years after Mr. Lopez's death. R. 245.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY
RULED THAT PEHP PROPERLY PAID LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
OF JESSE LOPEZ TO HIS LAST NAMED BENEFICIARY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW AND THE PEHP MASTER POLICY.
The Court should affirm the Hearing Officer's ruling that PEHP correctly paid life

insurance benefits to the last named beneficiary of Mr. Lopez-Ms. Mary Ellen Lopezas a matter of law. Both Utah law and the PEHP Life Master Policy require that PEHP
pay the last named beneficiary.
PEHP is created and governed by Utah Code Title 49, the Utah Retirement Act.
Section 49-11-609(2) requires, "[T]he most recent beneficiary designations signed by the
member and filed with the office ... are binding in the payment of any benefits due
under this title." Section 49-l 1-610(1)(d) then absolves PEHP, upon payment, from any
additional claim related to paying these benefits in stating, "The total of the payments
made [to a beneficiary] under this section shall fully discharge and release [PEHP] from
any further claims." Thus, under Utah law, PEHP was fully discharged and released
from any claims by the Weltys when it paid the life insurance benefits to the last named
beneficiary of Mr. Lopez.
The plain language of the PEHP Life Master Policy, which is the contract between
Mr. Lopez and PEHP, as originally written, also requires that PEHP pay the last named
beneficiary and absolves PEHP of further liability once it has done so. The Master Policy
requires that PEHP "will pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth herein,
the amount of coverage for which the Subscriber ... is covered." R. 300, Respt. 's Hr'g
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Ex. L, at 10. The provisions of the Master Policy allow Mr. Lopez to change his
@

beneficiary at any time. Section V states, "A subscriber may change his or her
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with the Plan." Id. Section V
concludes by providing, "Any payment made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this
provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the extent of such payment. ..." Id.
Thus, under applicable law and the contract, as written, PEHP properly allowed
Mr. Lopez to modify his beneficiaries in accordance with the policy language, and PEHP
must be discharged for the good faith payment it made to the last named beneficiary after
Mr. Lopez's death.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE PEHP
MASTER POLICY AS WRITTEN BECAUSE MR. LOPEZ FAILED TO
INCORPORATE THE DIVORCE DECREE INTO THE POLICY, AND
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT APPLY TO PEHP.
This Court should apply the plain language of Title 49 and the PEHP Life Master

Policy to this matter and not incorporate the Divorce Decree between Ms. Welty and Mr.
Lopez into the contract. In this case, Mr. Lopez did not specifically incorporate his
i>

Divorce Decree into the Master Policy. Although Mr. Lopez filed a change of
beneficiary form in 2003 naming "Diane for minor children as per attached divorce
decree," this was not specific enough to incorporate the Divorce Decree into the policy particularly when the document never mentions incorporation or any applicability to
PEHP. Additionally, PEHP never consented to incorporation of the Divorce Decree,
which is a prerequisite for it to be incorporated by reference.
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Yet, even if this Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was incorporated by
reference into the PEHP Life Master Policy, the plain language of the Divorce Decree
only ordered Mr. Lopez to take certain actions, not PEHP. Section 24 of the Divorce
Decree, the only section that relates to life insurance, states,
... That Respondent [Mr. Lopez] currently has in force and
effect a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of
$325,000.00. That Respondent [Mr. Lopez] is ordered to
maintain in full force and effect said life insurance policy
until such time as the last of the parties' children reaches age
18 or alimony terminates, whichever is later. During the
period that the child support is due, the Respondent [Mr.
Lopez] should be ordered to irrevocably designate the
Petitioner [Ms. Welty], as trustee for the minor children,
beneficiary on said life insurance policy....
R. 123, ,r 24; R. 241, ,r 4. Nowhere in the language of the Divorce Decree is PEHP
named in any way or required to take any action. R. 116-24. As such, this Court cannot
impose new duties on PEHP today.
In the alternative, even if this Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was
incorporated by reference into the PEHP Master Policy, and that the terms of the Divorce
Decree apply to PEHP, this would merely create an ambiguity in the Policy. The PEHP
Life Master Policy clearly allows for an insured to modify beneficiary designations at
will. R. 210. This is contrary to the Divorce Decree, which the Weltys argue required
Mr. Lopez to create an irrevocable beneficiary. R. 123. Such an ambiguity must be
resolved through the Court's contract construction rules by looking to the intent of the
parties. The language of the policy, beneficiary change forms, and actions of Mr. Lopez
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and PEHP in submitting and accepting beneficiary change forms clearly show that neither
~

party intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary.

III.

AS A MATTER OF EQUITY, PEHP SHOULD NOT BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE TO PAY BENEFITS TWICE, PARTICULARLY WHEN
THE WELTYS WAITED SIX YEARS TO BRING A CLAIM FOR MR.
LOPEZ'S LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS.

Although this case can and should be determined as a matter of law on the
arguments above, even if this Court were to review equitable claims and arguments,
PEHP must still prevail. As a matter of equity, absent bad faith, a life insurer like PEHP
is only required to pay on a policy once. See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83
(4th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n insurer is discharged from all subsequent liability when it makes
good faith payments to a purported beneficiary without notice of any competing
claims."). The Weltys never made a claim and point to nothing in their brief which
contradicts that PEHP made payment to Mr. Lopez's last named beneficiary in good
faith. As such, even if PEHP had made a mistaken payment and Ms. Welty is adjudged
to have been the proper beneficiary, PEHP is absolved from any claim that it has to pay
ti)

Mr. Lopez's life insurance benefit to Ms. Welty under general common law, and Ms.
Welty's remedy is against the party who received the payment.
The Utah common law, while allowing beneficiaries to be adjudicated under a
divorce decree, has never held that divorce decrees apply to non-party insurers. The
Weltys did not point to one case, and Appellees cannot find one, absent bad faith, that
found divorce decrees binding on the life insurer itself or requiring a life insurance
company to pay proceeds more than once to competing beneficiaries.
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Further, equity clearly favors PEHP in this matter due to the Weltys' nearly sixyear delay in bringing a claim for life insurance benefits. Mr. Lopez died on July 9,
2006. R. 243, 114. The very first contact the Weltys made with PEHP after Mr. Lopez's
death was not until May 1, 2012. See id. 120. This delay prevented PEHP from timely
investigating the Weltys' claims prior to payment. Thus, because of their failure to bring
a timely claim, the Weltys' equitable claims fail according to the principles embodied in
the common law doctrine of laches. PEHP would be injured due to the Weltys' lack of
diligence if it has to pay the benefit twice when it only received premium for one life
insurance benefit.

18
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ARGUMENT

I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY
RULED THAT PEHP PROPERLY PAID THE LIFE INSURANCE
PROCEEDS OF JESSE LOPEZ TO HIS LAST NAMED BENEFICIARY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW AND THE PEHP MASTER POLICY.
This Court should affirm the Hearing Officer's ruling that PEHP correctly paid life

insurance benefits to the last named beneficiary of Mr. Lopez following his death. No
dispute exists between the parties that Mr. Lopez maintained life insurance coverage with
~

PEHP through his employment with Salt Lake City Corporation. See R. 240, if 1. Upon
Mr. Lopez's death, PEHP paid the life insurance benefit of $173,000 to his last named
beneficiary, Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez, in accordance with the PEHP Life Master Policy and
Utah law. R. 243-44, at if 17. The only dispute is whether PEHP correctly paid the last
named beneficiary under the Master Policy and Utah law or should have waited almost
six years for a challenge by the Weltys before paying out the claim.

A.

Utah Law Requires PEHP to Pay the Last Named Beneficiary.

The Hearing Officer correctly ruled that PEHP was required by both Utah statute
and contract to pay life insurance benefits to the last named beneficiary of an insured.
URS and PEHP are governed by Utah Code Title 49, the Utah State Retirement Act.
Chapter 20 of this Title is the specific chapter which creates and governs PEHP as a
@

"program" of URS. However, Chapter 11 of Title 49 provides general information and
definitions which govern all the systems, plans and programs administered by URS,
including PEHP.
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Utah Code section 49-11-609 states in relevant part in regards to URS/PEHP
beneficiaries:
( 1) As used in this section, "member" includes a ... covered
individual ....
(2) The most recent beneficiary designations signed by the
member and filed with the office, including electronic
records, at the time of the member's death are binding in the
payment of any benefits due under this title.

The term "covered individual" is defined in section 49-11-102( 17) as "any individual
covered under Chapter 20, Public Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program Act." Mr.
Lopez was a "covered individual" under Title 49 because he was covered by PEHP life
insurance. Mr. Lopez's "most recent beneficiary designation[]" regarding his PEHP life
insurance was his current wife, Mary Ellen Lopez. Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-609(2).
Under statute, this beneficiary designation was thus "binding in the payment of any
benefits due" from PEHP. Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-609(2). Therefore, PEHP correctly
paid the life insurance benefit to Mr. Lopez's most recent named beneficiary.
Because PEHP paid the benefit to the most recent named beneficiary, Utah law
releases PEHP from any further claims for that paid benefit. Utah Code section 49-11610( 1)(d) states, "The total of the payments made [to a beneficiary] under this section
shall fully discharge and release [PEHP] from any further claims." Thus, under Utah
law, PEHP was fully discharged and released from any claims by the Weltys, or any
other alleged beneficiary, when it paid the life insurance benefits to the last named
beneficiary of Mr. Lopez.
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•

Despite the clear language of these Utah statutes, the Weltys attempt to use Utah
~

common law I to claim PEHP must pay life insurance benefits pursuant to the
beneficiaries listed in a Divorce Decree to which PEHP was not a party. See Appellants'
Br., at 20-21, 28-29 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484 (Utah 1975)). "Of
course, where a conflict arises between the common law and a statute or constitutional
law, the common law must yield." 2 Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 133738 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). As such, these Utah statutes override any legal or
equitable common law claims made by the Weltys regarding how a benefit should be
paid.
As such, because Utah statutes governing PEHP apply, this Court must find that
common law contract and equitable arguments take a back seat to the plain statutory
language, which may not be disregarded. Thus, in any claim against PEHP, if PEHP

®

pays the last named beneficiary, it is released from any further liability as a matter of law
by statute. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 49-11-609 and -610.

4il

~

i

1

As discussed infra, the common law, like the statutes, also absolves a life insurance
company from paying twice if it did so in good faith. See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 986
F .2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[ A]n insurer is discharged from all subsequent liability
when it makes good faith payments to a purported beneficiary without notice of any
competing claims."). Absent a competing claim by the Weltys, or notice from Mr. Lopez
that he intended to maintain the Weltys as his designated beneficiaries, it cannot be said
that PEHP had "notice of any competing claims." Id.
2
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this principle, finding that state common law yields
to applicable federal statute. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (ruling
that benefit must be paid to last named beneficiary of life insurance, despite contrary
divorce decree, because "controlling provisions of the [Serviceman's Group Life
Insurance Act] SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law," including
equitable remedies such as a constructive trust); see also Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655 (1950); Hillman v. Maretta, --- U.S.----, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).
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B.

The Plain Language of the PEHP Life Master Policy Requires PEHP to
Pay the Last Named Beneficiary.

The Utah statutes are dispositive of this issue. However, even if the Utah statutes
do not apply, the PEHP Life Master Policy, as originally written, also forbids PEHP from
paying anyone except the last designated beneficiary and allowed Mr. Lopez to change
his beneficiary at any time. The PEHP Life Master Policy, the contract between Mr.
Lopez and PEHP governing his life insurance benefits, states, "If a Subscriber and/or
Dependent dies, the Plan will pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth
herein, the amount of coverage for which the Subscriber ... is covered." R. 210
(emphasis added). Generally, an insured's right to change beneficiaries is governed by
the terms of the insurance policy. See, e.g., State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 216
S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2007). The PEHP Life Master Policy allows Mr. Lopez to change
his beneficiary at any time. Section V of the Master Policy states,
BENEFICIARY
A Subscriber [insured employee] shall designate a primary
beneficiary and a contingent beneficiary at the time of
application for coverage. A Subscriber may change his or her
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with
the Plan .... Any payment made by the Plan in good faith
pursuant to this provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the
extent ofsuch payment. ...
R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. L, at 10 (emphasis added). The Master Policy plainly allows a
Subscriber, such as Mr. Lopez, to change his beneficiary by filing a written notice of the
change. The Utah Supreme Court has declared,
The beneficiary of an insurance policy has merely an
expectancy, contingent on the insured's death. The insured, if
owner of the policy, during his lifetime, has a right to deal
with his policy in any manner he desires. This includes the
22

right to change the beneficiary, or to cash in the policy or sell
or assign his interest.

Culbertson v. Cont'/ Assur. Co., 631 P .2d 906, 909-10 (Utah 1981 ).
Furthermore, the PEHP Life Master Policy, like the applicable statute in Utah
Code section 49-11-610, discharges PEHP of its liability for life insurance proceeds upon
a payment made in good faith. See R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. L, at 10 ("Any payment
made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this provision shall fully discharge the Plan to
i)

the extent of such payment.").
Thus, based on the plain language of the Master Policy, Mr. Lopez was able to
change his beneficiary without permission from the beneficiary and at any time he chose,
and PEHP was obligated to pay the last named beneficiary. In so doing, PEHP was
accordingly discharged of any further liability.

C.

The Beneficiary Change Form Required PEHP to Pay the Last
Named Beneficiary.

In addition to the specific language in the Utah statutes and the PEHP Life Master
Policy, the 1999 PEHP beneficiary change form submitted by Mr. Lopez, that the Weltys
allege incorporates the Divorce Decree, specifically states that benefits will only be paid
to "the most recent beneficiary." R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. C. In fact, the 1999
beneficiary form states under the heading "Consideration when naming beneficiaries,"
that "Beneficiary payments are paid from the most recent beneficiary designation on file
with PEHP." Id. (emphasis added). This statement makes no sense unless all beneficiary
designations are revocable with PEHP under the plan.
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Thus, when PEHP paid Mr. Lopez's last named beneficiary, it complied with
Utah statutes, the contract governing the life insurance benefit as written, and the
beneficiary form that declared beneficiary designations revocable. Thus, the Hearing
Officer's ruling that PEHP paid the benefit to the correct party should not be disturbed.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
MASTER POLICY AS WRITTEN BECAUSE MR. LOPEZ FAILED TO
INCORPORATE THE DIVORCE DECREE INTO THE POLICY, AND
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT APPLY TO PEHP.

This Court should apply the plain language of the statutes and the PEHP Life
Master Policy as written, which require PEHP to pay the last designated beneficiary of
Mr. Lopez. Despite this plain language, the Weltys try to muddy this issue by incorrectly
attempting to incorporate the Divorce Decree into the PEHP Life Master Policy,
something neither Mr. Lopez nor PEHP intended. But even if the Divorce Decree was
incorporated into the PEHP Life Master Policy, PEHP must prevail as a matter of law
under the Court's contractual construction rules.
A.

The Divorce Decree Was Not Incorporated by Reference into the
PEHP Life Master Policy.

As a matter of law, Mr. Lopez's 1999 change of beneficiary form failed to
incorporate the Divorce Decree between Mr. Lopez and Ms. Welty into the life insurance
contract by reference. Although documents may be incorporated into contracts by
reference, Utah appellate courts have held individuals wishing to incorporate documents
to a strict standard. The Utah Supreme Court has stated,
Admittedly, parties may incorporate the terms of another
document by reference into their contract. Yet, the terms of
another document cannot be incorporated by reference
without specific language. Rather, "the reference must be
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clear and unequivocal," and alert the non-drafting party that
terms from another document are being incorporated.
Hous. Auth. of Cty. of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28,, 19, 44 P.3d 724 (quoting
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268,273 (Utah Ct. App.

1996)) (rejecting attempt to incorporate terms by reference when terms were not clear
and unequivocal). This Court has restated the rule:
In order "[fJor the terms of another document to be
incorporated into the document executed by the parties, the
reference must be clear and unequivocal, and must be called
to the attention of the other party, [the party} must consent
thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document must be
known or easily available to the contracting parties; ...."
Interwest Const. v. Palmer, 886 P .2d 92, 97 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added)

(quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 299, at 136 (1963)).
In this case, Mr. Lopez did not specifically incorporate his Divorce Decree from
@

Ms. Welty into the PEHP Life Master Policy. On December 3, 1999, Mr. Lopez filed a
change of beneficiary form with PEHP. R. 241-42,, 7; 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. B. Mr.
Lopez stated on that form that he named as his beneficiary, "Diane for minor children as
per attached divorce decree." Id. This statement did not provide a last name of Diane,
nor name the minor children. Only by referring to the Divorce Decree could the
beneficiaries be properly identified. Thus, while the Divorce Decree helped to name Mr.
Lopez's beneficiary, on its face, it did not clearly or unequivocally incorporate the
Divorce Decree into the contract, change or modify any terms of the PEHP Life Master
Policy, or create an irrevocable beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's statement on the 1999
beneficiary form is hardly the "specific," and "clear and unequivocal" language that is
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required to incorporate a document by reference-particularly when the actual language
never says that any document is being incorporated. See, e.g., Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 119;
Palmer, 886 P.2d at 97 n. 8.

Furthermore, PEHP (and likely Mr. Lopez) never consented to the incorporation
of the Divorce Decree into the contract. The Utah Supreme Court has held as a
requirement to incorporation, "Additionally, the party 'must consent thereto, and the
terms of the incorporated document must be known or easily available to the contracting
parties."' Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2009 UT 54,115,217 P.3d
716 ( finding that arbitration rules were agreed to and incorporated into agreement
between parties) (quoting Consol. Realty Group, 930 P.2d at 273). Consent is more than
the mere mention of the existence of a divorce decree. See, e.g., United Cal. Bank v.
Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm., 681 P.2d 390, 419-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("Mere reference

to a document for descriptive purposes does not operate as an incorporation of the
document into a contract." (Citations omitted.)). Instead, consent is a type of
"acceptance" under contract law. "[A] response is an acceptance where the offeree
manifests 'unconditional agreement to all of the terms of the offer.' The offeree must
'manifest a definite intention to accept the offer and every part thereof ... without
material reservations or conditions."' Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865
P.2d 1373, 1376 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), affd, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995), (quoting R.J.
Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah 1952)).

Nowhere can the Weltys point to where PEHP agreed or consented to all the
Divorce Decree terms as part of the PEHP Life Master Policy. The Weltys misstate the
26
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law when they claim that PEHP must be "bound by the incorporated decree even if they
@

were unaware of what the decree stated, chose not to read the decree, or simply did not
care to implement the decree." Appellant's Br., at 26-27. This only applies if PEHP had
actually consented to the Divorce Decree, something the Weltys conveniently leave out
of their analysis. Consent is of critical importance here because the Divorce Decree
purports to modify the plain terms of the actual written contract.
The Master Policy itself dictates how consent would be manifested,

®}

"MODIFICATION: No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless approved by
the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by endorsement or amendment to this
Master Policy.... " R. 210. Neither party to the Master Policy asserts that an
endorsement or amendment was supplemented to the Master Policy.
The Weltys cite to another provision of the Master Policy to contradict this
Ci

requirement, asserting that written statements of a subscriber can modify the contract
without PEHP's express consent. The Master Policy states, "ENTIRE CONTRACT:
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the written statements, if any, of
Subscribers, constitute the entire contract." Id. Reading these provisions together, it is
clear that to the extent that a Subscriber's written statement purports to change the terms
of the Master Policy, for example, to strike the subscriber's right to change a beneficiary
designation at any time and instead designate an irrevocable beneficiary, such a
modification must be made with PEHP's approval, evidenced by a written endorsement
or amendment.
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Because PEHP did not consent to the Divorce Decree or its terms, and the
reference to incorporation was not clear and unequivocal, the Divorce Decree was not
incorporated into the contract under Utah law, and PEHP correctly paid the last
designated beneficiary in accordance with the contract terms.
B.

In the Alternative, Even If the Divorce Decree Was Incorporated into
the PEHP Life Master Policy, the Plain Language of the Divorce
Decree Only Imposed Obligations on Mr. Lopez, and Not PEHP.

Despite the plain language of Utah Code sections 49-11-609 and -610, which
require PEHP to pay the last named beneficiary and absolve PEHP of further liability
once it has paid benefits, and despite the plain language in the PEHP Life Master Policy
that an employee can "change his or her beneficiary ... ," in the alternative, even if this
Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was incorporated by reference into the PEHP
Life Master Policy, the plain language of the Divorce Decree only ordered Mr. Lopez to
take certain actions, but did not order PEHP to take any action. Even the Weltys seem to
admit that the Divorce Decree only applied to Mr. Lopez when they state in the stipulated
facts, "In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as follows: ... " R. 241, ,r 4
(emphasis added).
When enforcing the terms of an insurance contract, the Court looks to the plain
language. "Well-accepted rules of contract interpretation require that we examine the
language of a contract to determine meaning and intent. Where the language is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language .... " Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ,r 10,225 P.3d 185 (citations
omitted).
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Therefore, assuming arguendo that the Divorce Decree became part of the
€ij

insurance contract, the plain language of the Divorce Decree only imposed duties on Mr.
Lopez, and not on PEHP, a non-party. 3 Section 24 of the Divorce Decree, the only
section that relates to life insurance, states,
24. That the Respondent [Mr. Lopez] currently has in force
and effect a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of
$325,000.00. That Respondent [Mr. Lopez] is ordered to
maintain in full force and effect said life insurance policy
until such time as the last of the parties' children reaches age
18 or alimony terminates, whichever is later. During the
period that the child support is due, the Respondent [Mr.
Lopez] should be ordered to irrevocably designate the
Petitioner [Ms. Welty], as trustee for the minor children,
beneficiary on said life insurance policy. The Respondent
[Mr. Lopez] should be ordered to provide the Petitioner [Ms.
Welty] with proof that the insurance is in effect within 30
days of entry of the Divorce Decree and providing
verification that said insurance is in effect by January 15 th of
each year thereafter.
R. 123, iJ 24; R. 241, iJ 4. Nowhere in the language of the Divorce Decree is PEHP
named in any way or ordered to take any action. R. 116-24. This Court cannot now
make up obligations for a non-party like PEHP nearly twenty years after the divorce. See

id. The Weltys' remedy to enforce the Divorce Decree is similarly clear, they are to
bring an order to show cause with the Court. 4

3

PEHP did not and would not ignore a valid Court order that applied to it. In this case,
PEHP did not ignore the Divorce Decree, it simply was not a party to the divorce
proceedings and therefore was not ordered by the Court to take any action.
4
Interestingly, Ms. Welty obviously knew how to enforce the Divorce Decree since she
filed for an order to show cause in November 1999. See Appellants' Br., at 32 ("In
November of 1999, Ms. Welty took the extraordinary step of paying the costs associated
with moving the court for an order to show cause regarding violation of the decree of
divorce."); R. 125. However, because Mr. Lopez was required provide verification of the
29

Furthermore, the Divorce Decree language was so factually deficient in regards to
the life insurance Mr. Lopez maintained at the time of divorce, that it may not even apply

Ci>

to Mr. Lopez, let alone to PEHP. At the time of divorce, Mr. Lopez maintained
$100,000, not $325,000, in life insurance with PEHP. R. 265, 19(d). Mr. Lopez
admitted to the District Court in 1999 that he had at least one other life insurance policy,

@

through Allstate Insurance, in addition to the PEHP coverage at the time of the divorce.

Id. Because the Divorce Decree speaks in the singular regarding "a life insurance
policy," it is unclear whether the requirement in the Divorce Decree was on Mr. Lopez to
maintain the PEHP policy, the Allstate policy, or some other policy that PEHP may be
unaware exists. R. 123. Such an ambiguity cannot be said to create a duty upon PEHP to
maintain a beneficiary of a policy that was not named and cannot be reasonably inferred
from the language.
Additionally, the plain language of the Divorce Decree is unclear regarding what it
actually ordered Mr. Lopez to do versus what Mr. Lopez "should be" ordered to do. The
Divorce Decree never actually ordered Mr. Lopez to name a specific beneficiary, but
only that he "should be ordered" to irrevocably designate Ms. Welty as beneficiary of the
unnamed life insurance policy. 5 Absent some additional, more specific order from the
Court, even Mr. Lopez was not specifically ordered to create an irrevocable beneficiary,
let alone PEHP having such a duty as a non-party. Indeed, if the Divorce Decree purports

life insurance policy annually, his failure to do so should have prompted Ms. Welty to
take further action to enforce the Divorce Decree.
5
Contrast that language with the specific language in the divorce decree where Mr. Lopez
"is ordered to maintain ... said life insurance policy." R. 264, 14.
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to create some legal duty upon PEHP, it may have been a due process violation for the
~

Court to order a non-party to perform certain actions in a civil matter absent notice and
the right to appear. See Dairy Product Servs. Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r 49,
13 P .3d 5 81 ("The minimum requirements [of due process] are adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.").
Therefore, as a matter of law6 and on its face, the Divorce Decree did not require
any action on the part of PEHP because PEHP was not a party and had no notice or
opportunity to be heard in the divorce proceeding.

C.

In the Alternative, Even If the Divorce Decree Was Incorporated into
the PEHP Life Master Policy, This Merely Created an Ambiguity in
the Contract Which Must Be Resolved in Favor of PEHP.

Despite the plain language of Utah Code section 49-11-609, which requires PEHP
to pay the last named beneficiary, and section 49-11-610, which absolves PEHP from
Ci

further liability if it pays the last named beneficiary, and despite the plain language in the
PEHP Life Master Policy that an employee can "change his or her beneficiary ... ," in
the alternative, even if this Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was incorporated
by reference into the PEHP Life Master Policy, this merely creates an ambiguity in the
Policy. Such an ambiguity must be resolved through the Court's contract construction
6

The cases that require payment of life insurance proceeds to a divorced ex-spouse are
awarded in equity, and not as a matter oflaw. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531
P.2d 484 (Utah 1975); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1975); Madsen v. Estate
ofMoffitt, 542 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975). The Weltys seem to conflate the two at times in
their brief arguing both that the Divorce Decree was incorporated into the agreement, and
that Utah law requires the payment of proceeds to Welty in equity under common law.
See Appellants' Br., at 20-23. Regardless of whether Appellants make an argument in
equity or law, it makes no difference to the outcome here since PEHP prevails under
either theory.
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rules by looking to the intent of the parties which clearly show that Mr. Lopez did not
intend to create an irrevocable beneficiary wlth PEHP.
Assuming arguendo that the Divorce Decree was incorporated into the PEHP Life
Master Policy, this would result in a contract ambiguity.
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable
of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies." ... [C]ontractual ambiguity can occur in two
different contexts: (1) facial ambiguity with regard to the
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the
intent of the contracting parties.
Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,125, 190 P.3d 1269 (quoting WebBank v. Am. Gen.
Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,120, 54 P.3d 1139).

Moreover, in evaluating ambiguity within the plain meaning
of a contract, a court will attempt to harmonize all of the
contract's provisions and all of its terms. If, however, a court
cannot resolve the problem by harmonizing ambiguous or
conflicting terms, as a matter of law, then the court may
properly conclude there is an ambiguity.
Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, 115, 139 P.3d 1073 (citations omitted).

Incorporation of the Divorce Decree would result in two conflicting provisions: First, the
PEHP Life Master Policy plainly states, "A Subscriber may change his or her
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with the Plan." R. 300, Respt.'s
Hr' g Ex. L, at I 0. And second, in contrast, the Divorce Decree states, "24.... [Mr.
Lopez] should be ordered to irrevocably designate [Ms. Welty], as trustee for the minor
children, beneficiary on said life insurance policy.... " R. 240, 14.
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This ambiguity would be resolved through the Court's contract construction rules
@v

by looking to the intent of the parties. "Insurance policies are contracts, and are
interpreted under the same rules governing ordinary contracts." Gee v. Utah State Ret.
Bd., 842 P .2d 919, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Village Inn Apartments v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581,582 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The Utah Supreme
Court has stated, "In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling."
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). "When interpreting a contract,
'we look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each
contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to
all and ignoring none." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, iJ 17, 84 P.3d
1134 (internal quotation omitted).
Looking to the intent of the parties, it is clear that neither Mr. Lopez nor PEHP
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intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary at any time. PEHP's intent is perfectly clear
from the plain language of the PEHP Life Master Policy. As stated supra, the actual
Master Policy language without the claimed incorporated Divorce Decree plainly states
that the subscriber/employee can change their beneficiary designation.
This intent is further evidenced by the testimony of the PEHP Life and Accident
Manager, Chris Lamkin ("Mr. Lamkin"), and the actions of PEHP. Mr. Lamkin testified
at the hearing on cross examination:
Q Could there be information - a box check [on the PEHP
beneficiary change form], so to speak, that made a beneficiary
irrevocable?

A No. We - our beneficiaries are always revocable.
33

R. 299, HT at 34:25-35:2. Further, PEHP always acted as if the named beneficiary was
revocable. Specifically, PEHP never made any statement that the beneficiary designation
by Mr. Lopez was irrevocable. And PEHP accepted additional beneficiary designations
from Mr. Lopez after the 1999 beneficiary designation, and ultimately paid the last
designated beneficiary. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. F, and H. Appellants have nothing to
show that PEHP intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary in Ms. Welty.
Similarly, Mr. Lopez's actions also show that he did not intend to create an
irrevocable beneficiary. Neither Ms. Welty, nor her son, Jacob, ever testified at the
hearing that Mr. Lopez had made a statement to them that he had made the beneficiary
designation with PEHP irrevocable. All Jacob testified to was that his father told him
that he wanted him to go to college. R. 299, HT 17:1-10 ("[Mr. Lopez] always had a big
desire for like all of us to finish school, and go to college, be successful. ... It's like he
always wanted us to go to college...."). 7 This statement is wholly unrelated to the life
insurance beneficiary designation.
Because Mr. Lopez is deceased, there was no direct testimony from him as to
whether he intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary. We only have his actions and
the language of the contract. Given that Mr. Lopez changed his beneficiary after sending
7

Of note, the Weltys' equitable argument that Jacob bore the burden of PEHP's error
utterly fails. The Weltys never provided any evidence or made any argument that they
relied in any way on the PEHP life insurance proceeds to their detriment. Indeed, under a
theory of equitable estoppel they would have to show that the so le reason for Jacob
incurring student loans was in reliance on being paid the life insurance proceeds from Mr.
Lopez. See e.g., McLeod v. Ret. Bd., 2011 UT App 190, ,-r 21,257 PJd 1090 (ruling that
member could not prevail against the Board on theory of equitable estoppel because he
failed to prove a specific statement that was later repudiated). This they have not done.
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the Divorce Decree to PEHP, it is clear that he did not believe that he had created an
(wJ

irrevocable beneficiary either. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. F, and H.
Because both PEHP and Mr. Lopez acted in accordance with Utah law and the
PEHP Life Master Policy that a beneficiary could be changed at any time, any ambiguity
in the contract must be interpreted to find that PEHP and Mr. Lopez intended all of Mr.
Lopez's beneficiary designations to be revocable.

III.
~

AS A MATTER OF EQUITY, PEHP SHOULD NOT BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE TO PAY BENEFITS TWICE, PARTICULARLY WHEN
THE WELTYS WAITED SIX YEARS TO BRING A CLAIM FOR MR.
LOPEZ'S LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS.

The Hearing Officer's ruling should be affirmed as a matter of law under both the
statute and PEHP Life Master Policy as discussed supra. However, even if this Court
were to review equitable claims and arguments, PEHP must still prevail. As a matter of
equity, absent bad faith, a life insurer like PEHP is only required to pay on a policy once.

See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (" ... an insurer is discharged
from all subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments to a purported
@

beneficiary without notice of any competing claims."). In addition, if the Weltys' delay
of roughly six years from the date of Mr. Lopez's death in bringing a claim causes PEHP
to pay twice, that would substantially harm PEHP and would set a precedent that causes
hardship upon legitimate beneficiaries who would have to wait for years before payment
of life insurance benefits.
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A. The Hearing Officer's Ruling that PEHP Correctly Paid the Benefits
Must Be Upheld Because PEHP's Good Faith Payment of Life Insurance
Benefits to Mr. Lopez's Last Named Beneficiary Discharges It from
Further Liability.
The common law across the country discharges and absolves insurers, such as
PEHP, from any further liability for life insurance proceeds after making a payment in
good faith to the last named beneficiary. Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly stated that
PEHP properly paid these benefits to the last named beneficiary. R. 289-98. Both
Federal and State Courts have held that there is a
... widespread principle that an insurer is discharged from all
subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments to a
purported beneficiary without notice of any competing
claims. Rogers v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co., 782
F.2d 1214 (4th Cir.1986); Weed v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of U.S., 288 F.2d 463,464 (5th Cir.1961); Commire v.
Automobile Club ofMichigan Ins. Group, 454 N.W.2d 248,
249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Kelly Health Care Inc. v.
Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica, Inc., 309 S.E.2d 305, 306 n. 1
(Va. 1983); Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 662
P.2d 1264, 1273 (Kan. 1983); In re Estate of Thompson, 426
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 198 I). Such a rule minimizes the
chances for imposing double liability for mistaken, but good
faith payments to a purported beneficiary.
Crosby, 986 F.2d at 83 (finding insurer acted reasonably in paying life insurance benefits

to named beneficiary and absolving insurer from liability to ex-wife). The Weltys have
never claimed that PEHP made payment to Mr. Lopez's last named beneficiary in
anything but good faith. See R. 261-76; 299, HT 38:8-46:14; see also Appellant's Br., at
20-38. Indeed, they cannot make such a claim for bad faith for the first time now. 8 Also,

8

"Generally, 'in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."'
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 15, 164 P.3d 366 (quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park,
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it is undisputed that at the time PEHP paid the claim to Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez, the
@

Weltys had not made any claim on the life insurance proceeds with PEHP or given PEHP
any notice of a disputed claim. R. 245. As such, under the widespread common law rule,
even if PEHP had made a mistaken payment and Ms. Welty is adjudged to have been the
proper beneficiary, having paid in good faith, PEHP is absolved from any further
payment.
The Utah Legislature has adopted a similar policy by statute in the Utah Insurance
Code governing life insurance. Although as a self-insured, employer-sponsored life
insurance program PEHP is not subject to the Utah Insurance Code, 9 the Utah Insurance
Code illustrates Utah's policy of protecting life insurance companies in paying benefits.
As a policy matter, the principle in this provision can be applied to PEHP, particularly in
regard to timely payment of claims. Utah Code section 31A-22-413(2)(a) states in

Gt>

relevant part," ... Notwithstanding section 75-2-804, 10 the insurer discharges its
obligation under the insurance policy or certificate of insurance if it pays the properly
designated beneficiary unless it has actual notice of either an assignment or a change in
beneficiary designation .... " Utah law discharges these insurers because Utah also
requires significant interest to be paid by a life insurance company that does not pay a

Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, il 14, 48 P.3d 968). Further, the Weltys cannot now make a
new claim of bad faith in a reply brief. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(c) ("Reply
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.").
9
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-103 (3 )( f), "Except as otherwise expressly provided, this
title does not apply to ... self-insurance[.] ..."
10
Utah Code section 75-2-804 creates a presumption, absent express terms to the
contrary, revoking any revocable beneficiary designation to a former spouse at the time
of divorce or annulment.
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claim within 30 days from the date the insurer receives notice of the claim. See Utah
Code Ann.§ 31A-22-428(3) (requiring insurers to pay 10% interest on top of regular
interest to beneficiaries after 30 days from employer receiving notice of death and claim).
Thus, as a policy matter, Utah encourages life insurers to review and resolve claims in a
timely manner, and then discharges insurers who do so from having to pay twice. This
policy also protects legitimate beneficiaries from having to wait perhaps years to receive
life insurance proceeds to see if some unnamed beneficiary may challenge the life
insurance claim. Such a delay in paying life insurance claims would create an undue
hardship on the life insurance company to pay additional interest, and particularly on
legitimate beneficiaries that are not able to access such life insurance proceeds. As such,
as a policy matter, life insurers like PEHP should be encouraged to adjudicate and decide
claims in a timely manner.
In addition to such policy arguments, Courts in some cases have even refused to
allow claimed beneficiaries to bring claims against insurers for double payment. For
example, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held, in Green v. Green,
The cases are legion in which wives or children who were
removed as beneficiaries of life insurance policies in violation
of the terms of separation agreements or divorce judgments
have been permitted to recover the proceeds of such policies
either from the improperly substituted beneficiaries or, where
the proceeds had not been paid out, from the insurers.

Green v. Green, 433 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (awarding children of first marriage life insurance proceeds from widow after
life insurer had paid last named beneficiary widow). Thus, only when the proceeds had
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not already been paid out could a person seek a remedy from the insurer in equity. See

id.
Rather than a remedy from PEHP, the Weltys' remedy is in equity against Mary
Ellen Lopez, the last named beneficiary to whom PEHP paid the proceeds, or from the
estate of Mr. Lopez, who was the one purported to be in contempt of the Divorce Decree.
In fact, the Weltys have already brought suit against Mary Ellen Lopez in Utah District
Court to recover the proceeds, but the claim appears to have been dismissed. See Case
History, Welty v. Lopez, Case No. 120902041, dated Dec. 8, 2014, attached hereto as
Appellee's Addendum F. Nevertheless, because PEHP had already paid out the proceeds
of the insurance policy when the Weltys first made a claim against PEHP roughly six
years following Mr. Lopez's death, PEHP cannot equitably be held responsible to pay out
additional proceeds.

B. Utah Common Law Related to Life Insurance Under a Divorce Decree
Only Adjudicates Between Competing Beneficiaries and Not Between an
Insurer and a Potential Beneficiary.
Rather than a remedy from PEHP, the Weltys' remedy is in equity against Mary
Ellen Lopez, the last named beneficiary to whom PEHP paid the proceeds, or from the
estate of Mr. Lopez, who was the one purported to be in contempt of the Divorce Decree.
Utah follows the general common law rule that a divorce decree can direct the
distribution of life insurance proceeds between competing beneficiaries. Travelers Ins.

Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484 (Utah 1975). However, the Weltys' attempt to extend the
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Utah common law cases far beyond their actual holdings I I and to impose duties on PEHP
or other insurers through divorce decrees even though they were non-parties to the
divorce proceeding should be rejected by this Court.
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, Travelers Insurance Company brought an
interpleader action between competing beneficiaries, the children of the deceased from
his first marriage, and the current widow. The Court held that in equity (not in law), a
divorce decree "should control the disposition of an insurance policy between contending
@

beneficiaries." 531 P .2d at 485-86 (emphasis added). The Court then awarded the
proceeds of the life insurance policy to the deceased's children from his first marriage.

See id. at 485 n.1. Thus, Travelers, far from requiring a life insurer like PEHP to pay
both the named beneficiary and the beneficiary under a divorce decree, holds only that, in
equity, a divorce decree can direct the original payment of life insurance benefits between
contending beneficiaries. See also Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1975)
(splitting life insurance benefit between ex-wife and widow where the amount of life
insurance was more than the amount available at divorce); Madsen v. Estate ofMoffitt,
542 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975) (allowing ex-wife a portion oflife insurance proceeds up to the

11

The Weltys' brief makes many broad questionable statements regarding the common
law in Utah, such as, "The Life Program was in the best position, and were [sic] obligated
to enforce the contractual rights established by the decree of divorce." Appellants' Br., at
31. However, Appellants cite no authority for such a position, and PEHP believes there
is none. The Weltys later similarly stated, "Life insurance programs ... bear the risk of
double payment if they pay a beneficiary that replaced an irrevocable beneficiary
designation." Id. at 33. Again, no authority is provided, and this is similarly untrue. See
Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (" ... an insurer is discharged from all
subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments to a purported beneficiary
without notice of any competing claims.").
40
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amount held at the time of divorce). The Weltys are simply incorrect with regard to
•

PEHP when they state, "Utah law dictates that when a divorce decree orders that a
beneficiary be irrevocable, subsequent changes of beneficiary are forbidden .... Utah
contract law binds [PEHP] to perform in light of the terms of the decree of divorce
submitted by Mr. Jesse Lopez." Appellants' Br., at 28-29. The implication is that the life
insurer cannot accept any additional beneficiary changes after the divorce decree. This is
not factually correct in any of the Utah cases as all involved situations when the
beneficiary was changed. See, e.g., Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239; Madsen, 542 P.2d 187. Of
course a person ordered to maintain a certain beneficiary CAN change that beneficiary, it
just means that they may be held in contempt for doing so by the divorce court. Id.
Thus, a more correct way to phrase the Court's holdings under the Utah cases would beParties to a divorce that are ordered to maintain beneficiaries on life insurance policies

@

are forbidden from changing their beneficiary designations or risk being held in contempt
of court for violating the decree of divorce.
In harmony with the Utah cases, both legal scholars and other courts have
recognized that when a court orders a beneficiary to be designated in a divorce decree,
that this does not bind the life insurer.
. . . [S]omething like irrevocability [of a life insurance
beneficiary] can result when the owner of the policy
promises, or is ordered by a court, to designate a certain
person as beneficiary, and not to change the designation
thereafter. Such mandates involve only the owner, not the
insurer[.} ... Of course, since the insurer is not involved, it
may not be bound by the promise, or order, if the owner fails
to name the appropriate beneficiary, or subsequently changes
that designation ....
41

Kelvin H. Dickinson, Divorce and Life Insurance: Post Modern Remedies for Breach of

a Duty to Maintain a Policy for a Designated Beneficiary, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 533,537
(1996) (emphasis added). After finding that the ex-spouse had an equitable interest in a
life insurance policy of the insured, the New York Court of Appeals articulated the rule
that, "This is not to say that an insurance company may not rely on the insured's
designation of a beneficiary. None of this opinion bears on the rights or responsibilities

of the insurer in law or in equity." Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y.
1978) (emphasis added). In other words, the divorce decree does nothing to bind the
insurer, but only splits the benefits in equity between the competing beneficiaries.
Even in the Weltys' cited cases from other state jurisdictions that support the Utah
common law, 12 the Weltys did not point to one case that found divorce decrees binding

12

See Appellant's Br., 21 n.3, citing Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 911,
917 (?1h Cir. 1990) (holding under Indiana law that as between competing beneficiaries,
unpaid life insurance proceeds in an amount existing at the time of divorce decree were
properly placed in an equitable constructive trust for children of first marriage);
Tintocalis v. Tintocalis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
estate of deceased was liable to ex-wife for the value of life insurance proceeds defined in
divorce under equitable constructive trust); Reeves v. Reeves, 223 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Ga.
1976) (determining between competing beneficiaries to allow minor children to receive
unpaid life insurance proceeds in amounts in force on date of divorce); Appelman v.
Appelman, 410 N .E.2d 199, 202-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (recognizing a cause of action for
"imposition of a constructive trust upon the recipient of life insurance proceeds to which
the plaintiff has an equitable claim"); Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189, 195 (N.Y.
1978) (holding named beneficiaries liable to ex-wife under theory of constructive trust
when insurer had already paid life insurance proceeds to beneficiaries); McKissick v.
McKissick, 560 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Nev. 1977) (concluding that life insurance proceeds
received by second wife were held in constructive trust for the benefit of first wife and
children pursuant to divorce decree); Thomas v. Studley, 571 N.E.2d 454, 459-60 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989) (holding estate of deceased liable to ex-wife on behalf of minor child for
42
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on the life insurer itself or that require a life insurance company to twice pay proceeds to
@>

competing beneficiaries. As such, PEHP requests this Court to uphold the common law
by finding that divorce decrees apply only to the parties to the divorce, but do not bind
non-parties, like PEHP, to create irrevocable beneficiaries.

C.

The Equities Favor PEHP Because the Weltys' Almost Six-Year Delay
in Making a Claim Created an Irreparable Harm to PEHP in
Reasonably Evaluating Their Claim.

As a matter of law, PEHP paid the correct last named beneficiary of Mr. Lopez.
However, even if this Court determines that PEHP paid the incorrect beneficiary, the
Weltys' roughly six-year delay in bringing a claim for life insurance benefits prevented
PEHP from timely investigating the Weltys' claims prior to payment.
Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006. R. 243, ,r 14. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a
claim from Mary Ellen Lopez. Id. 1 16. Having received no other claim on the benefits,
@

PEHP paid the life insurance benefit to Mary Ellen Lopez, the last named beneficiary, on
or about August 2, 2006. R. 243-44, 117. The very first contact the Weltys made with
PEHP after Mr. Lopez's death was on May 1, 2012, nearly six years later. See id. ,I 20.
The Weltys made no claim at the hearing or in their brief that they did not know that Mr.
Lopez had died, nor that they were unaware of the life insurance policy. Indeed, Ms.
Welty admits to talking to Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez just after the death about payment of
the life insurance proceeds to Ms. Welty on behalf of Jacob. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex.
M, ,r,r 1-2. The only excuse offered by Ms. Welty in failing to timely file a notice of

amounts of life insurance awarded in divorce decree); excluding Utah cases discussed
supra.
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claim with PEHP was that she was told by Mary Ellen Lopez "that [Mary Ellen Lopez]
had discussed the issue with her attorney, and that she did not have to pay any money to
Jacob, but merely had to list Jacob on the title to her condo." Id. at ,r 2. 13 As a matter of
equity, failure to even assert a claim against PEHP within nearly six years of the death is
not what a reasonably diligent person would do to perfect a claim for life insurance
benefits.
In equity, PEHP should not be punished by having to pay the life insurance
benefits twice due to the Weltys' failure to bring a timely claim. An evaluation of this
equitable factor is akin to the common law doctrine of laches. "'The equitable doctrine
of laches is founded upon considerations of time and injury. Laches in legal significance
is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another."' Insight Assets, Inc. v.
Farias, 2013 UT 47, ,r 17,321 P.3d 1021 (quoting Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769,

773 (Utah 1951)). "Lachesis 'based upon [the] maxim that equity aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights."' Id. (quoting CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001
UT 37, ,r 14, 24 P.3d 966 (alteration in original)). '"[L]aches has two elements: (1) a
party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence."' Id. ,I 19
(quoting Fundamentalist Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010
UT 51, ,r 27,238 P.3d 1054 (alternation in original)).
13

This certainly begs the question as to whether the parties to the divorce had worked out
a different arrangement outside the decree of divorce in regards to Mr. Lopez's life
insurance obligations. It is certainly possible that Mr. Lopez promised Jacob the "condo"
in exchange for changing the beneficiary on his PEHP life insurance. Nevertheless, this
again highlights the impossible nature of an insurance company like PEHP being put in a
position to enforce a divorce decree when the company was not a party to the divorce
proceedings.
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The principle embodied in the doctrine of laches directly applies to and prevents
the Weltys' equitable claim. The Weltys failed to take any action with respect to Mr.
Lopez's life insurance until nearly six years following Mr. Lopez's death. This certainly
shows a lack of diligence when the filing of a claim would have sufficed to put PEHP on
notice of a potential claim. Further, PEHP would be injured due to the Weltys' lack of
diligence if it has to pay the benefit twice due to the Weltys' neglect when it only
received premium for one life insurance benefit. Thus, the Weltys' equitable or public
@

policy arguments should be rejected under the doctrine of laches because the Weltys
waited nearly six years before attempting to bring a life insurance claim following the
death of Mr. Lopez.
In sum, the Weltys provide no equitable reason for this Court to disturb the
Hearing Officer's ruling. Under the common law, absent bad faith, an insurance
Ci

company like PEHP cannot be held to pay the benefit twice. Utah cases support this
position that divorce decrees may adjudicate life insurance rights between competing
beneficiaries, but do not apply to non-party insurers. Furthermore, even considering the
equities in this case, the equities fall in PEHP's favor because the Weltys waited roughly
six years prior to asserting a claim for benefits against PEHP.
CONCLUSION
The Hearing Officer's Order that PEHP properly paid the last named beneficiary
should be affirmed in both law and equity. Utah statutes specifically require PEHP to
pay the last named beneficiary and then absolve PEHP, upon payment, from any
additional liability. The PEHP Life Master Policy does the same. Thus, when PEHP
45

paid the last named beneficiary, it was released from any further liability as a matter of
law. The Weltys' attempt to incorporate the Divorce Decree into the PEHP Master
Policy fails because the language is not clear and unequivocal, and the Divorce Decree
terms were never consented to by PEHP.
In addition, even if this Court were to only look at the equities of the matter, PEHP
should not be required to pay the life insurance benefit twice because it paid the claim in
good faith. PEHP takes no position regarding the relative fairness of what Mr. Lopez did
@

with his beneficiary designations with PEHP. Perhaps Mr. Lopez violated the terms of
the Divorce Decree. But the Weltys' remedy for any alleged violation of the Divorce
Decree is against the named beneficiary who received the proceeds or the estate of Mr.
Lopez. PEHP cannot be held liable for someone else's alleged failure to discharge their
duty. The equities fall in PEHP's favor since the Weltys waited almost six years after the
death of Mr. Lopez to put PEHP on notice of their competing claim. For the foregoing
reasons, PEHP requests that the Hearing Officer's Order, approved by the Board, be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this cfL\~ay of February, 2016.

Associate General Counsel
Utah Retirement Systems
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

DIANE WELTY AND JACOB LOPEZ,
Petitioners,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER

v.

File #: 13-12L

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
BOARD, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
GROUP TERM LIFE PROGRAM,

Hearing Officer: J. Dennis Frederick

Respondent.

A hearing was held on July 16, 2015, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on
Petitioners' Request for Board Action. Petitioners, Diane Welty and Jacob Lopez, were
represented by Scott M. Rogers with Huntsman Lofgran, and Respondent, the Utah State
Retirement Board ("USRB"), Public Employees' Health Program's ("PEHP,') Group Term Life
Program ("Life Program"), was represented by Liza J. Eves with Howard, Larsen, Hansen &
Eves, LLC. Based upon the testimony given, the evidence received and the l egal memoranda
1

submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued a Ruling on July 16:, 2015, and requested that
counsel for the PEHP Life Program prepare an order. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now

makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
1

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Parties stipulated to the following facts in writing prior to the hearing:

1.

Jesse Gavina Lopez ("Mr. Lopez,,) was employed by Salt Lake City Corporation

("City,,) and was covered by a group term life insurance policy offered to City employees through the
Public Employees, Health Program ("PEEP") Life Program.
2.

Mr. Lopez, and petitioner, Dia1_1e Welty ("Ms. Welty',) were married in August 1978

and divorced in October 1997.

3.

On October 29, 1997, a Decree ofDivorce was ordered by Judge Pat B. Brian of the

3rd District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as follows:
24. That the Respondent currently has ir~ force and effect a life insurance policy on
his life in the face amount of $325,000.00. That Respondent is ordered to maintain in
full force and effect said life insurance policy until such time as the last of the parties,
children reaches age 18 or alimony terminates, whichever is later. During the period
that the child support is due, the Respondent should be ordered to irrevocably
designate the Petitioner, as trustee for the minor children, beneficiary on said life
insurance policy. The Respondent should be ordered to provide the Petitioner with
proof that the insurance is in effect within 30 days of entry of the Divorce Decree and
providing verification that said insurance is in effect by January 15th of each year
thereafter.

5.

In July 1999, Mr. Lopez had coverage of$173,000.00 with the Life Program, of which

$50,000.00 was funded by the City and the rest funded by Mr. Lopez.
6.

On December 3, 1999, PEHP received a Group Term Life Application from Mr.

Lopez dated on or about November 29, 1999. The application indicated that Mr. Lopez was applying
for $300,000.00 in Basic Group Term Life Coverage. The application named Diane (petitioner) for
minor children as per attached divorce decree and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary
beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's request for additional coverage was cancelled in December 1999 based
upon contact from the Citfs Human Resources Department.
2
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7.
I)

On December 3, l 999 the Life Program received a Beneficiary Change Form signed

by Mr. Lopez on November 29:, 1999 which listed Petitioner:, "Diane (petitioner) for minor children
as per attached divorce decree" as primary beneficiary and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary
beneficiary.
8.

The Life Program received a written copy of the Decree of Divorce entered by the

Third District of the State of Utah on October 29, 1997 attached to the Beneficiary Change Fonn
submitted by Mr. Lopez on or about December 3, 1999.
9.

In a Verified Response to Petitioner's Order to Show Cause signed by Mr. Lopez on

December 6, 1999, Mr. Lopez provided the following:
a. On or about the 31 st day of October:, 1997 this Court entered a Decree of
Divorce based upon the entry of Respondent's default.
b. The Decree of Divorce contained a number of misstatements of fact, some
even inconsistent with the tenns of the Petition from which the default was
taken. Respondent was not provided with a copy of the Decree of Divorce
until long after the time to set the default had expired under Rule 60(b),
U.R.C.P.
c. In reality Respondent never had a life insurance policy on his life with a face
amount of $325,000.00.
d. At the time of divorce Respondent owned two policies. The first was a basic
term policy offered through his employment for approximately $100,000. The
second was a universal life insurance policy offered through Allstate
Insurance which insured his life for only $50,000.00, and which also insured
the life of Petitioner for $50,000.00. (See Exhibit "A") [Exhibit not included].
Thus, Respondent's factual burden to cany insurance has always been
approximately $150,000.00.

~
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10.
@

On July 24, 2003, the Life Program received an Additional Group Tenn Life

Employee Enrollment Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about July 15, 2003. Mr. Lopez applied for
additional coverage up to $300,000. The designated primary beneficiary was Petitioner Diane Lopez,
his ex-wife for minor child $300,000 per divorce decree and his son Petitioner Jacob Lopez as
contingent beneficiary. This beneficiary change form also reflects Jacob Lopez's ~ate of birth as

3
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August 27, 1988. However, Mr. Lopez did not complete underwriting requirements, and he was never

®

issued the additional coverage.
11.

In addition to the Additional Group Term Life Employee Enrollment Fonn on July

24, 2003, PEHP received a Beneficiary Change Form signed on or about July 15, 2003, by Mr. Lopez.
fi)

The form revoked any previous nominations of beneficiazy(ies) and designated Mary Ellen Lopez his
wife and his ex-wife Diane Lopez petitioner for minor child as primary beneficiaries.
12.

@,

On October 24, 2003, PEHP received a Group Tenn Life Change Form signed by Mr.

Lopez on or about October 21, 2003. The fonn stated in relevant part: "Revoking any previous
nomination or beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the following individuals to receive all benefits
payable upon my death." Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife, as primary beneficiary

~

and Joshua G. Lopez, his son, as contingent beneficiary.
13.

On March 20, 2006, PEHP received a Group Tenn Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary

Change Fonn signed by Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006. The form stated in relevant part:
i)

"Revoking any previous nomination or beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the following individuals
to receive all benefits payable upon my death. 11 Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as
primary beneficiary.

@

Ci

14.

Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006.

15.

Jacob Lopez was 17 years old at the time of Mr. Lopez's death.

16.

On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Group Tem1 Life Program Claimant's Statement

from Mary Ellen Lopez.
17.

On or about August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in the amotmt of $173,000.00 to

Mary Ellen Lopez, the beneficiary designated on the Group Tenn Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary
Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006.

4

18.

The Life Program Group Tenn Life Master Policy (''Master Policy,,) is the

contract between the Life Program and its covered members.
19.

The Master Policy states:
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
If a Subscriber and/or Dependent dies, the Plan will pay to the beneficiary.,
subject to the provisions set forth herein, the amount of coverage for
which the Subscriber and/or Dependent is covered.
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary.... Any payment made in good
faith pursuant to this provision fully discharges the Plan to the extent of the
payment.
BENEFICIARY
A Subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary and a contingent beneficiary at
the time of application for coverage. A Subscriber may change his or her
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with the Plan. The change
will take effect as the date the Subscriber signed the notice of change ... Any
payment made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this provision shall fully
discharge the Plan to the extent of such payment.
MODIFICATION
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless approved by the Plan and

unless approved by the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by
endorsement or amendment to this Master Policy. No agent has authority to
change this Master Policy or waive any of its provisions.
NOTICE OF CLAIM
A written notice of claim must be given to the Plan within (20) days after the
death of a Subscriber and/or Dependent unless it was not reasonably possible to
do so. Notice given by or on behalf of a Subscriber and/or Dependent or his
beneficiary if any, to the Plan at its office in Salt Lake City, Utah, with
information sufficient to identify the Subscriber and/or Dependent., shall be
deemed notice to the Plan.
TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as reasonably possible after
receipt of an acceptable written proof of loss together with all supporting
materials ....
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
All benefits wiH be payable to the beneficiary. If any payment remains unpaid at

5

the death of the beneficiary, or if the beneficiary is a minor or is, in the opinion of
the Plan, legally incapable of giving a valid receipt and discharge for any
payment, the Plan, at its option, may pay such benefit to any relative or relatives
by blood or connection by marriage of the Subscriber and/or Dependent who is
deemed by the Plan to be equitably and legally entitled to receive the payment.
Any payment made in good faith pursuant to this provision fully discharges the
Plan to the extent of the payment. ...

~

\151

LEGAL ACTION
No legal action may be brought against the Plan for unpaid benefits until at least
sixty (60) days after written proof of loss has been furnished in accordance with
the requirements stated above. No legal action may be brought after the
expiration of three years after the time written proof of loss is required to be
furnished.
ENTIRE CONTACT
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the written statements, if any, of
Subscribers, constitute the entire contract.

20.

On August 28, 2012, Petitioner, Ms. Welty submitted a notice of claim to the Life

Program in which she presented a dispute regarding the distribution of Mr. Lopez,s life insurance
coverage.
21.

Ms. Welty indicated that Mr. Lopez .had a life insurance policy with Allstate Life

Insurance in the amount of$300,000.00 on or about October 29, 1997.
22.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-618 ''All data in the possession of the office is

confidential, and may not be divulged by the office except as permitted by board action." Petitioners
were not, and could not be, supplied with beneficiary designation infonnation until they brought this

request for board action.
23.

On or about May I, 2012, Diane Welty and Jacob Lopez served a summons and

complaint to Utah Retirement Services and PEHP in Third District Court to recover life insurance
proceeds paid by PEHP through the Group Tenn Life Plan to Mary Ellen Lopez the designated
beneficiary of Mr. Lopez. Mary Ellen Lopez was also named as a Defendant in this action.
24.

On September 19, 2012, the action brought in Third District Court against PEHP was

6
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.

dismissed without adjudication because the Comt lacked subject matter jurisdiction over-the claims
against PEI-IP. In a Declaration submitted in the Third District Court, Petitioner, Ms. Welty indicated
the following: "1. Shortly after the death of my ex-husband, Mr. Lopez, I contacted Mrs. Lopez
regarding the life insurance proceeds for my minor son, Jacob Lopez. 2. Mrs. Lopez told me that she
had discussed the issue with her attorney, and that she did not have to pay any money to Jacob, but
merely had to list Jacob on the title to her condo."
25.

Petitioners filed an Amended Request for Board Action on April 5, 2013.

26.

On September 3, 2013 Respondents waived all arguments relating to barring claims

pursuant to an applicable statute oflimitations.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioners brought this action under Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) which ·states, ''The
moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear the burden of proof.,,

2.

PEHP is governed by Title 49, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code.

3.

The PEHP Life Program Master Policy is the contract between PEHP's Life Program and
its covered members.

4.

®

Petitioners' Request for Board Action in this matter is a legal dispute distinguishable from
an

5.

equitable dispute.

Pursuant to the Master Policy, the Life Program paid proceeds to the designated
beneficiary listed on Mr. Lopez's Beneficiary Change Form, dated March 20, 2006. The
LTD Program followed the procedures for the payment of life proceeds in accordance
with the Master Policy terms created by statutory frame work.

6.

Petitioners did not meet their burden of proof that there was an error or legal defect in how
the Life Program paid the beneficiary proceeds to Mary Ellen Lopez.

7

ORDER

· ·

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioners' request for the payment of life insurance
proceeds because the Life Program paid the wrong beneficiary is denied.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. The Board chairman or
executive director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20)
days of receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

If any party is aggrieved with the final Board order, that party may seek a judicial review
within thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. The
appealing party shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board acti_ons resulting from formal
proceedings. All parties shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-101
et. seq.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Steven M. Rogers, Counsel for Petitioner

8

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Adjudicative
Hearing Officer are hereby adopted as the Order of the Utah State Retirement Board.

Dated this

,z'«-- day of ~1.JqJr

, 2015.

~RD

~ ~e'sident

9
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this I '8"'-r<- day of August, 2015, I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order, postage pre-paid, to the
following:
Steven M. Rogers
HUNTSMANjLOFGRAN
623 East Fort Union Blvd., Suite 201
Midvale, Utah 84047
Liza Eves
Howard, Larsen, Hansen & Eves, LLC
560 East 200 South, Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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SELF-FUNDED AND ADMINISTERED GROUP
TERM LIFE and ACCIDENT PLA·N.

MASTER POLICY

•

This Term Life and Accident Plan is created for its insureds, pursmmt to the term_s and conditions of Title 49, Chapter 20
of tbe Utah Code Annotated. This Master Policy establishes the coverage and benefits available to Employees and their
eligible Dependents. The provisions of these coverages are set forth in detail on subsequent pages.
Coverage

· Act OfTerrorism

•

Means an act, including but not limited to the use
of force or violence and/ or the threat thereof, of any
person or group(s) of persons, whether acting alone or
on behalf of or in connection with any organization(s)
or govenunent(s), committed for political, religious,
ideological or similar purposes including the intention
to influence any government and/ or to put the public,
or any section·of the public, in fear. An Act of Terrorism
is a Catastrophic Event under this Master Poli_cy.
Act Of War

•

War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil_
war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, civil commotion
assuming the proportions of or amounting to an uprising, military or usurped power. An Acfof War is not a
Catastrophic Event under this Master Policy.
Catastroph ic Event

•
•
•

Means all individual losses arising out of and directly
occasioned by one sudden, unexpected, unusual specific
event occurring at an identifiable time and place. Howeve1~ the duration and extent of any such event shall be
limited to 72 consecutive hams ,md within a 100 mile
radius for any such event hereunde1~ and no individual
loss which occurs outside such period c1nd/ or radius
shall be included in that Catastrophic Event. PEHP may
choose the date and time when such period of consecutive hours commences and also the specific 100 mile
radius determining an event. If any event is of greater
duration than the above period, PEEP may divide that
event into two or more events, provided that no two
periods overlap and provided no period commences
earlier than the date and time of the first recorded individual loss to PEHP arising out of the event.

The eligibility of a Subscriber and/ or Dependent to
~enefits pro.vided und.e r this Mpst.er Policy, s ubject to
the terms, conditions, Limitations and Exclusions of this
Master Policy. Benefits must be provided, a) when this
Master Policy is in effect; b) prior to the date that any
individual termination condition occurs.
Dependent

1. The Subscriber's iawful spouse.

2.

Chi,ldren or stepchildren of the Subscriber that are not
arid have never been married up to the age of 26 who
have a Parental Relationship ½ii.th the Subscriber.

3.

Unmarried legally adopted children, foster children,
and children through legal guardianship up to the
age of 26 are eligible subject to PEHP receiving
adequate legal documentation. (Legal guardianship
must be court appointed.)
·

4.

Umnarried children who are incapable of self support because of an ascertainable mental or physical
impairment, upon attaining age 26, may continue
Dependent Coverage, while remaining totally disabled, subject to the Subscriber's Coverage continuing in effect. Periodic medical documentation is
required. Insured must furnish written notificc1tion
of the disability to PEI-IP no later ·than·31 days after
the date the Coverage would i1orn.1ally terminate: In
the notificc1tion, the Insured shall include the name
of the Dependent, date of birth, a statement that the
Dependent is LUunarried, and details concerning:

>- The condition which led to the Dependent's
physical or mental disability;

>- Income, if any, earned by the Dependent; and
> The capacity of the Dependent to engage in
employment, attend school, or engage in normal
daily activities.

»PEHP » WWW.PEHP.ORG
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•
•
•

>- ]f proof of disability is approved, the Depen~

SECTION I

dent's Coverage may be continued as Jong as he/
she remains totally disabled and unable to earn
a living, and as long as none of the other causes
of termination occur (e.g. marriage). Proof of the
Dependent's continued disability may be required periodically by PEHP.

Accelerated Benefit

The amount of group coverage which v,1ill be paid in
advance of a Subscriber's death if the Subscriber is terminally ill.

5. Stepchildren who no longer have a Parental Relationship with a Subscriber will no longer be eligible
to receive benefits under th.is Group Plan.
6. Depenqent does not include an unborn fetus.

Evidence Of lnsurability

Employee

•

An Empl~yer's Emploiee who 'is eligible
Group Term Life and Accident Plan.

Evidence that c1n Employee enrolling for coverage meets
the underwriting requirements of the Plan:

to emoll 111 the

Line-Of-Duty Death

Employer

•

The State, its educational institutions and political subdivisions that are eligible to participate and h ave elected to
participate in the Public Employee's Benefit and Insur-ance Program of Title 49, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code
Annotated.
Enrollment

••

•
•

The process whereby an Employee makes written application for Coverage tlu·ough PEHP, subject to specified
time periods and policy provisions.
Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Terrorism

Means an event in any way caused or contributed by an
act of terrorism involving the use or release or the threat
thereof of any nuclear weapon or device or chemical or
biological agent. Nuclea1~ Chemical or Biological Terrorism is not a Catastrophic Event w1der this master policy.

Terminally Ill

A person is terminally ill if he or she has been diagnosed
by a physician as having a medical condition which
causes the Employee or Subscriber to have a life expectancy of 18 months or less from the date of the diagnosis.
The Subscriber must provide the Plan satisfactory proof
of the limited life expectancy. Such proof must include
certification by a physician. The Plan reserves the right
to obtain a medical opinion from a second physician at
its own expense.

SECTION II

Parental Relationship

The relationship between a natural child or stepchild
and a parent while the child or stepchild is dependent
on the parent for insurance. Example-the stepfather has
coverage on a child then divorces the child's natmal
mother. The stepfather no longer has a Parental Relationship with the child.
Plan

This plan 0£ coverage administered by the Public Employees Health Program.

•

A death resulting from external force, violence, or disease occasioned by an act of duty as an employee.

Subscriber

An Employer's Employee who has enrolled for Coverage in the Group Term Life and/ or Accident Plan.

· EMPLOYEE MINIMUM TERM COVERAGE
Employee minimw11 Term Coverage is funded exclusively by the Employer. Coverage is c1vailable in
amounts up to $50,000, subject to an automatic 50%
reduction cit age 71 and again at age 76.
Line-of-Duty Death Benefit: If a Subscriber suffers a
"Line-of-duty Death" the Plan will pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth herein, a lwnp sum
in the amount of $50,000.
Accident Benefit Rider - An employee who is killed in
an accident will be eligible for an additional $10,000 benefit, subject to the provisions of the Public Employees
Health Program Group Accident Plan.

£JI.~'·•·.
·-··
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•

EMPLOYEE BASICTERM COVERAGE
Einployees enrolled in Minimum Term Coverage may
enroll in Basic Term Cove_rage. Employee Basic Tenn
Coverage is funded exclusively by the Employee at rates
to be determined by the Public Employees Health Plan.
Employee Basic Term Coverage is available to Employees without Evidence of Insurabili~, if applied for within
60 days of employment. Evidence of Insurability will be
required if Employee Basic Term Coverage is applied
for after the 60 day time period. Employee Basic Term
Coverage is subject to automatic reductions at ages 71
and 76.

EMPLOYEE ADDITIONAL TERM COVERAGE
{OPTIONAL)
Eligible Subscribers may select optional coverage
amounts, subject to underwriting requirements. If a Subscriber covered by the Plan is also covered as a Spouse
under Dependent coverage, the maximum cumulative
coverage for any individual is $450,000. The maximum coverage for a spouse who is not an Employee is
$450,000.
Coveroge amounrs ore subjecr co auromolic 1ec/11aio11 at 091 71 and again or age 76 in amounts
determined by rhe Public Employees Heaflh Plan.

Evidence of Insurability will be required before coverage will be issued for Additional Term Coverage. The
Plan has the right, if the Evidence of Insurability is not
satisfactory, to decline coverage to the Subscriber and/ or
Dependents.

A Subscriber who does.not apply for coverage for his or
her Spouse or Dependents within sixty (60) days from
the date of their eligibility, must furnish, at Subscriber's
own expense, satisfactory evidence of the Dependen.f's
insurability before the Dependent can obtain coverage.
The Plan has the right, if the Evidence of Insurability
is not salisfoctory, to decline coverage to the Spouse or
Dependents.
·

GROUP TERM LIFE ACCELERATED BENEFIT
Coverage Clause

If a Subscriber is tenninally ill, the Plan will pay an
Accelerated Benefit to the Subscriber. The Accelerated
Benefit will be a percentage of the total term coverage in
force on the life of the Terminally Ill Subscriber. The Acee!erated Benefit will not exceed 75% of the total coverage in force and will be paid either in one lmnp SLun or
monthly payments as directed by the Subscriber.
Conditions

The Accelerated Benefit will be available to a Subscriber
on a voluntary basis only. Therefore:

>- If a Subscriber is required by law to use this option
to meet the claim of creditors, whether in bankruptcy or otherwise, the Subscriber is not eligible for this
benefit, or

•

to use this option in order to qualify for, apply for,
· or continue a government benefit or entitlement, the
Subscriber is not eligible for th.is benefit.

SPOUSE AND DEPENDENTTERM COVERAGE

•

Subscriber may enroll Spouse and/ or Dependents in
Dependent Term Coverage as follows:

>-

Spouse - Subscriber may enroll for Spouse Coverage
in amounts from $5,000 to $450,000.
Coverage amounts ore subject to automotic reducfi(:jl at age 71 andagain at age 76 in
amounts de/ermined b)' the Public Employees Heal/!, Pion.

>-

•

EFFECT ON COVERAGE
The Accelerated Ben~fit payment will reduce the face
amount of the group coverage m1d thus reduce correspondingly the amount to be paid to the beneficiary(ies)
upon the death of the Subsci:'iber:The redudio1i·will be ·
equal to the sum of the follovving amounts:

Children - Subscriber may enroll for Dependent
Child Coverage for up to $10,000.

•

Coverage far newborns is limited to S1,000 up /oage 6months. The maximum Chlld
Coverage is S10,000 per eligible subsai/Jer.

>- An interest charge on the benefit amount commenc-

•

A Spouse may be enrolled in up to $15,000 of SpoLtse
Term Coverage within sixty (60) days of the Subscriber's
date of hire without providing Evidence of InsLu-ability.
A SpoLtse may apply for higher levels of coverage, which
requires providing Evidence of Insurab.ilit:y.

»PEHP » WWW.PEHP.ORG

The amount paid under the Accelerated Benefits option; and
ing from the Accelerated Benefit payment date to the
date of death calculated at the cun·ent yield on the
ninety (90) day US Treasw-y Bill (to a maximum of
18 months of interest); and

Underwriting Requirements

•

If a Subscriber is required by a government agency

>-

Current monthly term coverage premiums the Subscriber and/ or Employer was paying prior to the
date of election of Accelerated Benefits commencing
from the date of the first payment of the Accelerated
Benefit LU1til the date of death.

•
•

PEHP PLUS TERM LIFE OPTI ON

Any changes in coverage amounts will be effective on
the date specified in writLng by the Plan.

An Ernployee or spouse who has been declined coverage because of PEHP underwriting requirements may
qualify for coverage, if approved, under the PEHP"Plus ·
Term Life option. Specific underwriting requirements
and higher rates have been established for this option.
For more infonrnition regarding PEI-IP Plus, contact
PEHP at 801-366-7495 or 800-753-74:95.

All Employees must be enrolled in Employee :tviinimum
Term Coverage.
The Plan reserves the right to decline coverage of an
Employee and/ or Dependent if Evidence of Insurability
is not satisfactory.
Employees Entering Late

LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS

An Employee who does.not apply for coverage within
sixty (60) days from the date of eligibility, or who reapplies for coverage after his or her coverage has been
canceled at the Empl.oyee' sown request or without
termination of employment, .must fLu-rush satisfactory
Evidence of Insurability in order to obtain coverage. An
Employee who does not apply for coverage for his or
her Dependents within sixty (60) days from the date of
eligibilit}~ must furnish, at the Employee's expense, satisfactory evidence of the Dependent's insurability before
the Dependent can obtain coverage. The Plan has the
right to decline coverage if the Evidence of Insurability
is not satisfactory.

Group Term Life Suicide Exclusion

•
~
I
I

For Subscribers, with respect to any amounts in excess .
of Minimum Term Coverage, or fot: Dependerits with respect to all coverage, benefits ·will not be paid or payable
if the Subscriber and/ or Dependent commits suicide
within hvo years of the effective date of coverage. Any
premiums paid for such coverage will be refunded.
Homicide Exclusion

Accidental deaths are routinely investigated. Absolutely
no benefit will be paid to a beneficiary if the beneficiary
intentionally takes the life of the insmed Subscriber
and/ or dependent.

Coverage When Disability Coverage Exists

If a Subscriber is receiving long-term disability benefits
pursuant to a policy or p lan issued to the Employer
and whose disability occurred while the Subscriber was
covered under this coverage, Minimum Coverage will
continue as long as the Subscriber receives the long-term
disability benefit. I£ a Subscriber who is receiving longterm d isabili t}' benefits and is eligible under this provision dies, the Plan will pay to the beneficiary the benefit
amount of the Minimum Term Life Cove.rage for which
the Subscriber is covered. PEHP will have th e right to
require proof that the Subscriber is still receiving longterm disability benefits.

Misstatement Of Material Fact

In the absence of fraud, the validity of any coverage will
not be contested, except for nonpayment of premiwns,
after it has been in force for h~ro years from the effective
date of coverage. No statement made by any person
relating to his or her ability to be covered wilt be used
in contesting the validity of the coverage with respect
to which the statement was made after th~ coverage has
been in force, prior to the con.test, for a period of two
years during the person's lifetime, nor will the statement
be used unless it is contained in a ·written insh·ument
signed by the covered individual. :

A Subscriber may continue Additional Term coveragt?
in the Scjme amount that was in effect on the date of
disability for a maximum of twelve (12) months from
the date of disabilit}r with the current premium waived
for twelve (12) months. After t1,velve (12) months, the
Subscriber funded por tion of Additional Term coverage
may be continued, but is limited to 50% of the amount
of coverage for which the SL1bscriber was enrolled at the
end of the twelve (12) month period from the date of
disability. Application for this coverage must occur with
i..i1 sixty (60) days from the end of the twelve (12) month
period referred to above. Eligibility for this coverage will
continue for as long as the Su bscriber receives longterm disability benefits. Separate rules for t)us coverage
may be established by the Plan. I£ a Subscriber becomes
ineligible to receive long-term disability benefits and the

GENERAL INFORMATION
'

When a Subscriber selects additional coverage amounts,
the Subscriber may do so subject to the Employer's election and the Plan limitations. If the Employer changes to
a lesser amount of coverage, the Subscriber's coverage
will be decreased to conform to the new election and
effective as of the first day of the Subscriber's annual
enrollment. (See Section III, Effective Date of Coverage)

If a Subscriber's coverage amount changes due to age,

•

the Subscriber's coverage will be decreased to the correct coverage amount as of the elate the Subscriber's age
changes.

11!:••·
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SECTION Ill

Employer has maintained continuous Additional Term
coverage with the Plan, the existing coverage in effect
may be continued under the Continuation of Coverage
•provision.

GROUP TERM LIFE CONTINUATION OF COVERAGE

•

Annual Salary

An individual covered under this Plan does not have
a right to convert coverage to an individual policy in
the event that the person loses coverage hereunder
for any reason. Howevet~ a Subscribe1· and his or her
· Dependents may continue partial coverage hereunder if,
after losing eligibility, the Subscriber and/ or his or her
Dependents continue to be member(s) of any retirement
system sponsored by the Utah Retirement Systems and:
pay premiums.

The amount certified by the Employer as the monthly
salary, excl uding such. amounts as overtime, bonuses,
discretionary payments, etc., of the Subscriber. If there
is a discrepancy belween the certified amount and the
amount actually paid, PEI-IP shall determine the regL1lar
monthly salary.
Hospital

1. An institution, which is licensed by the state in
which it resides, accredited by the Joint Commission
for Accreditation (JCAHO), and maintains Medicare
and Medicaid approval for services.

Coverage under this provision is limited to 25% of
the amount of coverage for which the individual was
enrolled on the date preceding the date of loss of eligibility. Separate rates for this coverage v,rill be established
by the Plan. Application for this coverage must occur
within sixty (60) days from the date of loss of eligibility
as an active Employee or termination of coverage Lmder
the Plan. A line-of-Duty Death benefit is not part of the
continuation coverage under this section.

2.

Any other institution which is operated pursuant to
law, under the supervision of a staff of physiciai,s
and with twenty-four .hour per day nursing service,
w hich is primarily engaged in providing;

:> General inpatient medical care and treahnent of
sick and injured persons through medical, diagnostic, and major surgical facilities, all of which
facilities must be provided on its premises or
under its control, or

MISSTATEMENT OF AGE
If the age of any Subscriber and/ or Dependent has been
misstated, the Plan will make a premium adjushnent
so that the Plan shall be fully charged or credited, as
the case may be, for the difference in premiums for the
full time any coverage has been in force. If the amount
of coverage would have been affected by the misstatement of age, the amount shall be adjusted to the amount
which the Subscriber and/ or Dependent would have
been entitled at h.is or her correct age, and the adjustment of premium shall be based on such adjusted ·
amount of coverage.

>- Specialized inpatient medical care and treatment of sick or injured persons tlu·ough medical
and diagnostic facilities (including x-ray and
laboratory) on its prem.ises, under its conh·ol, or
through a written agreement or with a specialized Provider of those facilities.
In no event shall the term Hospital include a facility.
operated primarily as an out-patient or free standing
unit, or a convalescent nmsing home or an institution or
part !:hereof which is Hsed principally as a convalescent,
rest, or nursing facility or facj]ity for tl,e aged, or which
furnishes primarily domiciliary or Custodial Care, including training in the routines of daily living, or which
is operated primarily as a school.

PREMIUM CALCULATION
Any premiums payable may be adjusted amu1ally to determine an average premium rate per $1,000 of coverage
then in force. Premium rates will be determined on the
attained age to the nearest birthday of each Subscriber
and/ or Dependent, and the amount of coverage on each
Subscriber and/ or Dependent.

Injury

A bodily injury sustained solely thorough accidental
means and independently of all other causes and occurs
,,vhile coverage is in effect Lmder the policy; except that,
witl1 respect to the Accident Weekly Indemnity and
Accident Medical Expense Benefit, it means any sue~
bodily injury for which no benefits are payable under a
worker's compensation or similar law or act.

•

•
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Loss Of A Limb

TOTAL DISABILITY

Loss by physical separation of a hand at or above the
wrist, or of a foot at or above the ankle.
Loss Of Hearing

The Subscriber is unable to engage in his regular occupation and is not engaged in any other-occupation, and
during such period is under the regular care and· attendance of a legally qualified· physician or surgeon:

Loss of hearing which is certified as being entire and
irrecoverable by a licensed physician specializing in
otolaryngology and certified by the American Board of
Otolaryngology.

SECTION ii

Loss Of Sight

•
•

Loss of sight which is certified as being entire and
irrecoverable by a licensed physician specializing in
ophthalmology and certified by the American Board of
Ophthalmology.

ACCIDENTAL DEATH, DISMEMBERMENT, LOSS OF
USE AND LOSS OF SIGHT BENEFIT (AD&D)

Loss Of Speech

Loss of speech which is certified as being entire and
irrecoverable by a licensed physician specializing in
otolaryngology and certified by the American Board of
Otolaryngology.

Employee Coverage Only (Individual Plan)

A Subscriber may select any amount of Principal Sum
ranging from $25,000 to $250,000.
Employee And Dependent Plan
(Family Plan)

Loss OfThumb And Index Finger

Loss by physical separation through or above the metacarpophalangeal joints.

Under the Family Plan a Subscriber may select any
amount of Principal Sum for Subscriber on the same
basis as for the Individual Plan, and then eligible Dependents are automatically covered as follows: spouse is·
automatically insured for a Principal Sum equal to 40%
of Subscriber's Principal Sum and each eligible Dependent child is insured for 15% of Subscriber's Principal
Sum. If Subscriber has no eligible dependent children,
the spouse's Principal Sum is increased to 50% of Subscriber's I?rincipal Sum. If no spouse is eligible, each
eligible dependent child's Principal Sum is increased to
20% of Subscriber's Principal Sum.

Loss Of Use

•
•

With respect to Arm or Leg, paralysis resulting in total
loss of all range of motion and use of such limb which
continues without interruption for a period of twelve
(12) months and at the end of such period is determined
by competent medical authority to be continuous, permanent and irrecoverable.

MEDICAL EXPENSE
The actual expenses incurred for:

>-

ACCIDENT WEEKLY INDEMNITY BENEFIT (AWi)
(OPTIONAL COVERAGE)

Treatment by a legally qualified ·physician or surgeon: or

:>- Confinement within a hospital; or

•
•

Employee Coverage Only (Not Available For
Dependents)

:>- Employment of a licensed or graduate nurse; or

>>-

If a Subscriber is enrolled in AD&D coverage under this
Group Accident Plan, in addition to the AD&D coverage he or she may purchase Accident Weekly Indemnity
coverage which will pay the Subscriber benefits while he
or she is totally disabled because of injury resulting Erom
an accident which was not job related or.which did not
occur on the job, provided such total disability started
within 90 days of the accident. Coverage begins on the
first day of total disability and is payable while such disability continues, but for not more than 52 weeks for any
one accident.
~ •r

X-ray examination; or
Use of a professional ambulance service for local
transportation of a subscriber; provided the expense
has been incurred for necessary services, confinement or treatment given within one year of the date
of the accident, and the charges therefore are reasonable and customary for the locale.

L}i:;:~~;,tNT
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LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS

Amounts Of Coverage And Cost

Subscribers may purchase the AWI Coverage in units
up to $500, subject to the maximum amount indicated in
the Monthly Gross Salary bracket. The Subscriber may
purchase a lesser amount than the maximum amount .indicated for their salary bracket but not a greater amou nt.
The coverage table can be fow1d i11 the Life and Accident
Brochure.

Air Travel

The Policy, subject otherwise to its terms, limitations arid
condition, covers claims arising out of bodily injury s·ustained by an Insured Person while riding as a passenger
in, alighting from, or boarding (but not while operating,
learning to operate or serving as a member of a crew of)
a civil aircraft having a valid airworthiness certificate
from the governmental authority having jurisdiction
over private aircraft in the country of its registry and
flown by crop-dusting, seeding, skywriting, racing or
exploration.

ACCIDENT MEDICAL EXPENSE BENEFIT (AME)_
(OPTIONAL COVERAGE ) ·
Employee Coverage Only {Not Available For
Dependents)
·

•
•
•

If a Subscriber is enrolled as an Employee for AD&D

Exclusions

coverage under this Group Accident Plan, in addition to
the AD&D coverage (and Weekly Indemnity coverage,
if elected) he or she may purchase Accident Medical Expense coverage which will pay for the follov,ring medical
expenses which are in excess of expenses covered by
all_other Group Medical Plans and by No Fault Automobile Insurance. Such medical expenses include the
reasonable costs inci.irredfor treatment by a physician or
surgeon, for hospital confinement, and for employment
of a licensed or graduate nurse necessitated by injury
resulting from an accident which was not job related
or did not occur on the job, provided the expense was
incurred within one year of the date of the acci~ent.

The policy does not cover any loss or claim arising out
of bodily injury caused or contributed to by or resulting
from:

Amounts Of Coverage And Cost

Subscriber may purchase the Accident Medical coverage
in an amount of $2,500.

Engaging in or taking part in naval, military or air
force service or operations, except as provided in the
Reserve- National Guard provision;

>-

Riding or driving in any kind of race as a professional;

>-

Being in or on or boarding an aircraft for the purpose of flying therein or alighting there from following a flight, except as specified in the Air Travel
provision;

>>-

Suicide or attempted suicide;

treatment (except where the treatment is rendered
necessary by.bodily injury caused by accident
within the scope of the policy);

:> Subject to the terms and conditions of the policy,
coverage shall apply while the Subscriber hereund~r is a member of a!) organized Reserve Corps or •
National Guard Unit of the United States and:

)+-

Voluntary self administration of any drug or chemical substance not prescribed by and taken according
to the directions of a licensed physician (accidental
ingestion of a poisonous substance is not excluded);
or

>-

Any loss caused b)~ resulting from or contributed
to by the insured's intoxication. An insured will be
considered to be intoxicated if the level of alcohol in
his/her blood when the injury odoss occurs exceeds
the amount at which a person is presttrned, ,mder
the law of the locale in which the accident occurred,
to be under the influence of alcohol or intoxicating
liquor when operating a motor vehicle.

>- In attendance at annual field b-aining, cruise or other
active duty or training period of fewer that 30 days
(except that while attending a service school the coverage will extend for the duration of the school even
though in excess of 30 days), or is enroute to or from
such training; or

•
•

•

.intentionally self-inflicted .injUI")~ or committing or
attempting to commit a criminal or felonious act;

.> Disease or natural causes, or medical or surgical

RESERVE - NATIONAL GUARD COVERAGE

•

•

>-

Participating in a properly authorized periodic .inactive duty training assembly or any other inactive duty
training authorized by appropriate unit orders; or
Participating as a member of his/ her unit or detachment in an authorized parade, exhibition or ceremony on official orders.
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SECTION V

•

EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE

•
•

The effective date of the coverage is the day following
the end of the payroll period for which the first payroll
premium deduction is made. Howevei~ if the covered
Subscriber is not actively at work and engaging in and
performing his or her normal duties on a regular basis
except for duties performed at home or while confined
in a hospital on the effective date, coverage will become
effective on the day he or she returns to active work. If
the Dependents of a Subscriber are to be covered, and
if a Dependent is confined to a hospital on the effective
date of the Subscriber's coverage, the coverage of the
Dependent will not become effective until the day after
he or she is discharged. Dependent coverage is not effective prior to an Employee's effective date.

(ii) when a Subscriber ceases active work with his or
her Employer due to temporary layoff or leave of
absence, or for any other-reason other than sickness or injury as described above, termination of
employment shall be deemed to have occurred
no later than twelve (12) months following the
cessation of active full-time work. Premiun1s
must be paid for coverage to continue.

•

ELIGIBILITY
All Employees and their Dependents are eligible.
An individual who becomes a Dependent after the Sub-

scriber's effective date will be eligible for coverage on
the date he or she becomes a Dependent, provided the
Subscriber submits a written application for coverage
within sixty (60) days of that date. Coverage for prospective adoptive children will become effective on the date
the child is placed for purposes of adoption provided a
written application for coverage is received by the Plan
within sixty (60) days of that date.

•

(i) when a Subscriber ceases employmer).t because
of injury or sickness, he or she will remain eligible tq continue coverage for up to twelve (12)
months if injury or sickness persis.ts to·.that time.
Premiums must be pa~d for coverage to continue.
Termination occurs when the employer discontinues a Subscriber's coverage by so notifying the
Plan or discontinuing premium payment, ·but in
any event no later than twelve (12) months following cessation of employment due to injury or
sickness; or

TERMINATION OF DEPENDENTS COVERAGE
The coverage on any Dependent ceases automatically on
whichever of the following dates occurs first

•

The end of a coverage period for which a premium
contributioq was made if the $ubscriber fails to
make any subsequently required premium contributions.

>-

The date the Dependent becomes eligible for cover- ·
age as an Employee under this coverage.

>-

The date the Dependent becomes a full-time member of the military.

>-

The date of attainment of the maximLUn age for coverage described herein.

The date th.is coverage is canceled; or

>-

The end of a coverage period for which a premium
contribution was made if the Subscriber requests
termination or has become ineligible, except:

The date the Dependent (spouse) is not considered
the Subscriber's lawful spouse as indicated in a
divorce decree.

>-

The date the Subscriber's coverage terminates for
any reason other than death of the Subscriber, including Subscriber's retirement.

TERMINATION OF COVERAGE
The coverage on any Subscriber ceases automatically on
whichever of the following dates occurs first:

•

Six (6) months following the date the Subscriber's
coverage terminates due to the death of the Subscriber. During the six-month period between the
death of the Subscriber.and the date of the tern,ination of the Dependent coverage, the premium payment for the Dependent coverage will be waived;

>

If, within sixty (60) days after the date upon which a
Dependen.t child's coverage would othenvise terminate
due to a maximum ·age limitation, the Plan has received
a statement from a physician that·the child is mentally . .
or physically incapable of earning a living and is dependent upon the Subscriber for support, coverage will
continue for the child for so long as incapacity continues.

>
>-

The date in which the Subscriber retires unless the
Employer has established a program, with which
the Plan has agreed, to continue coverage beyond
retirement.
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CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE

•

•
•

Aggregate benefits payable for any single Catastrophic Event shall be limited to $50 million per
year. If benefits payable due. to a Catastrophic Event
exceed $50 Million, benefits shall be paid on a pro
rata ba'sis.
Aggregate benefits payable due to Acts of Terrorism
shall be limited to $50 :tvlillion per year.
Benefits under this Master Policy shall be subject to
all of the limitations, exclusions and terms of any
reinsurance coverage in place to reinsure the coverages available under this Master Policy.

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
If a Subscriber and/ or Dependent dies, the Plan will
pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth ·
herein, the amount of coverage for which the Subscriber
and/ or Dependent is covered. Unless otherwise requested in writing by the Subscriber, benefits payable as
a result of the death of a Dependent shall be paid to the
Subscriber, if living or otherwise, to the next qf kin of the
deceased in the order of precedence established under
Title 75, Chapter 2, the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

BENEFICIARY

•

•

A Subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary
and a contingent beneficiary at the time of application for coverage. A Subscriber may change his or her
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change
with the Plan. The change shall take effect as of the date
the Subscriber signed the notice of change, whether or
not the Subscriber is living at the time of such filing, but
without prejudice to the Plan on account of any payment made by it before receipt of such notice. If there
is no beneficiary designated by the Subscriber or if the
desi211ated
beneficiary• is not alive at the death of the
-0
Subscriber and/ or Dependent, the Plan will pay the benefits of this coverage to the contingent beneficiary, and if
there is no contingent beneficiary the Plan will pay the
benefit amounts of this coverage to the next of kin of the
deceased in the order of precedence established under
Title 75, Chapter 2, the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Any
payment made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this
provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the extent of
such payment.

If the primary beneficiary survives the Subscriber but

i

t

dies before the benefit is paid, the benefit shall be paid to
the contingent beneficiary.
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SECTION VI
CONFORMITY
Any provision of this Plan which, on its Effective Date,
is in conflict with the applicable law shall be deem_e d to
conform to the minimum requirements of the law.

MODE OF PAYMENT
Unless otherwise arranged with the Subscriber, all pre-·
miums due from the Subscriber shall be paid to the Plan
by withholding premiums from the pay checks of the
Subscriber and forwarded to the Plan by the Employer.
Premiums withheld shaU be deemed tq have been received by the Plan, but shall not constitute payment for
coverage under this coverage if coverage has otherwise
terminated.

ENTIRE CONTRACT'
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the
w ritten statements, if any, of Subscribers, constitute the
entire contract.

MODIFICATION
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless
approved by the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by endorsement or am_e ndment to this Master
Policy. No agent has authority to change this Master
Policy or waive any of its provisions.

DATA TO BE FURNISHED
· Subscribers are required to furnish to the Plan, when
and so often as the Plan may reasonably require, all
information as may be considered to have a bearing on
the administration of the coverage under this Plan or the
determination of the premium therefore. The Plan shall
have the right to inspect, during normal business ~1ours,
an Employee's payroll and such other records wluch
pertain to the coverage provided hereunder.

CLERICAL ERROR
Clerical error in keeping records shall not invalidate
coverage otherwise in force nor continue coverage
otherwise terminated. Premium adjustments shall be
made if a clerical error has caused an incorrect amount
of premium to be collected or paid.

£r::;·&
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RATE SCHEDULES

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS .
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. If any
payment remains unpaid at the death of the beneficiary,
· · or if the beneficiary is a minor or is, in the opinion of
the Plan, legally incapable of giving a valid receipt and
discharge for any payment, the Plan, at its option, may
pay such benefit to any relative or r elatives by blood
or connection by marriage of the Subscriber and/ or
Dependent who is deemed by the Plan to be equitably
and legally entitled to receive the payment. AJ.1.y payment made in good faith pursuant to th.is provision fully
discharges the Plan to the extent of the payment. If there
is no designated beneficiary living at the death of the
Subscriber and/ or Dependent as to all _or any part of the
sum, the Plan may pay a part of that sum, not exceeding
$5,000 to any person appearing to the Plan to be equitably entitled to the money.

The Plan may revise any premium rate schedule no
more frequently than annually unless a change in the
coverage affecting rates occurs, and then maj, d o so
·upon the effective date of such change.

SECTION VII
NOTICE OF CLAIM

•

A v,,ritten notice of claim must be given to the Plan within nventy (20) days after the death of a Subscriber and/.
or Dependent unless it was not reasonably possible to
do so. Notice given by or on behalf of a Subscriber and/
or Dependent or his beneficiary if an:}~ to the Plan at its
office in Salt Lake Cit)~ Utah, with information sufficient
to identify the Subsaiber and/ or Dependent, shall be
deemed notice to the Plan.

LEGAL ACTION
No legal action may be brought against the Plan for
unpaid benefits until at least sixty (60) days after written proof of loss has been furnished in accordance with
the requirements stated above. No legal action may be
brought after the expiration of three years after the time
written proof of loss is required to be furnished.

CLAIM AND PROOF OF LOSSFORMS

,,.,m

•
•
•

When the Plan receives a notice of a claim, it
furnish
to the claimant the form it customarily uses to establish
proof of loss. If such forms are not furnished within 15
d·ays after the receipt of the notice of claim, the claimant
shall be deemed to have complied with the requirements
as to proof of death. Once supplied, the written proof of
.Joss together with all supporting materials necessary to
establish proof of loss must be returned to the Plan at its
office within 90 days after the date of the death causing the loss under this coverage. Failure to furnish such
proof within the time required will not invalidate or
reduce any claim if it was not reasonably possible to give .
proof within such.time, provided.such proof.is furnished .
as soon as reasomibly possible.

PHYSICIAN EXAMINATION
The Plan, at its own expense, shall have the right to
require any Subscriber and/ or Dependent to undergo
and report the findings of a physical examination when
and as often as it ID?Y reasonably require. Additionall)~
the Plan, at its own discretion and expense, may require
that an autopsy be performed on the body of a deceased
Subscriber al')d/ or Dependent during the pend ency of a
claim hereunder.

MEDICAL REPORT
At the time of the claim, the Plan, at its own expense, has
the right and opportunity to examine and receive medical reports, medical records, and hospital records relating to the care, treahnent, and relevant medical history
of the person whose death is the basis for a claim. Any
person claiming benefits shall cooperate with the Plan as
necessary to implement this provision.

TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as
reasonably possible after receipt or an acceptable written
proof of loss together with all supporting materials.

If benefits are not paid within 30 days, interest will begin

•

to accrue 30 days following the Plan's receipt of proof of
loss form and supporting materials. Th e interest rate will
be based on the current yield on the ninety (90) day US
Treasury Bill and will be fixed on the date that interest
begins to accrue.
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APPEALS
If a claim is denied, in whole or in part, the Plan will
send a written notice specifying the reason(s). If a
Subscriber and/ or Dependent, his or her beneficiary, or
an authorized representative disagrees with ~he denial
or disagrees with any decision made by the Plan which.
affects them, he or.she may request a full review of the
claim or submit the grievance by writing to:

PEHP Life Review Committee

. 560 East 200 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
An appeal must be submitted within sixty (60) days after
receiving the notice of an adverse action of the Plan. If
the Subscriber and/ or Dependent, beneficiary or repre·sentative desires to appeal the decision of that committee, the appeal must be directed to the Executive Direc'tor of the Utah Retirement Systems. Further appeal may
be made in accordance with the procedure established
under Section 49-11-613 et seq, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended, 1953. A copy of this procedure is available
from the PEHP Claims Review Committee.

•
•
•

•
•
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ADDENDUMC

§ 49-11-609. Beneficiary designations--Revocation of beneficiary ... , UT ST § 49-11-609

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Prooosed Leoislation

IWest's Utah Code Annotated
ITitle 49. Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (Refs & Annas)
[Chaoter 11. Utah State Retirement Systems Administration
IPart 6. Procedures and Records
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-609
Beneficiary designations--Revocation of beneficiary designation--Procedure--Beneficiary not
designated--Payment to survivors in order established under the Uniform Probate Code--Restrictions on
payment--Payment of deceased's expenses

§ 49-11-609.

Currentness

@

( 1) As used in this section, "member" includes a member, retiree, participant, covered individual, a spouse of a retiree
participating in the insurance benefits created by Sections 49-12-404 and 49-13-404, or an alternate payee under a domestic
relations order dividing a defined contribution account.

(2) The most recent beneficiary designations signed by the member and filed with the office, including electronic records, at
the time of the member's death are binding in the payment of any benefits due under this title.

(3)(a) Except where an optional continuing benefit is chosen, or the law makes a specific benefit designation to a dependent
spouse, a member may revoke a beneficiary designation at any time and may execute and file a different beneficiary
designation with the office.

(b) A change of beneficiary designation shall be completed on forms provided by the office.

@

(4)(a) All benefits payable by the office may be paid or applied to the benefit of the surviving next of kin of the deceased in
the order of precedence established under Title 75, Chapter 2, Intestate Succession and Wills, if:

(i) no beneficiary is designated or if all designated beneficiaries have predeceased the member;

(ii) the location of the beneficiary or secondary beneficiaries cannot be ascertained by the office within 12 months of the
date a reasonable attempt is made by the office to locate the beneficiaries; or
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(iii) the beneficiary has not completed the forms necessary to pay the benefits within six months of the date that
beneficiary forms are sent to the beneficiary's last-known address.

(b)(i) A payment may not be made to a person included in any of the groups referred to in Subsection (4)(a) if at the date
of payment there is a living person in any of the groups preceding it.

(ii) Payment to a person in any group based upon receipt from the person of an affidavit in a form satisfactory to the
office that:

(A) there are no living individuals in the group preceding it;

(B) the probate of the estate of the deceased has not been commenced; and

(C) more than three months have elapsed since the date of death of the decedent.

@

(5) Benefits paid under this section shall be:

(a) a full satisfaction and discharge of all claims for benefits under this title; and

(b) payable by reason of the death of the decedent.

Credits

*

*

Laws 1987, c. 1, § 25; Laws 1989, c. 81, § 8; Laws 1998, c. 267, 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 283, 3, eff March
16, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 141, 5, eff. March 15. 2001; Laws 2002, c. 250, 32. eff. March 26, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 240.
11, eff. May 5, 2003: Laws 2004, c. 118, 4, eff. July l. 2004; Laws 2005, c. 116. 6, eft: May 2, 2005.

*

*

*

*

*

Codifications C. 1953, § 49-1-606.

U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-609, UT ST§ 49-11-609
Current through 2015 First Special Session
c 20 I h Thums1111 R..:ui.:r:,. \.o -:laim ll• ,,riginal I .~. Ci11\ ..:rnm..:nl \\, 111'-...
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ADDENDUMD

§ 49-11-610. Benefits payable in name of beneficiary--Delivery, UT ST§ 49-11-61 O

!West's Utah Code Annotated
fTitle 49. Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (Refs & Annos)
IChapter 11. Utah State Retirement Systems Administration
!Part 6. Procedures and Records
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-610
§ 49-11-610. Benefits payable in name of beneficiary--Delivery

Currentness

(l)(a) Any benefits payable to a beneficiary shall be made in the name of and delivered to the beneficiary or the lawfully
appointed guardian or conservator of the beneficiary, or delivered as otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction
under Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate Code.

(b) If the benefit involves a payment not to exceed an amount authorized by the Utah Uniform Probate Code to any one
beneficiary, the office may, without the appointment of a guardian or conservator or the giving of a bond, pay the amount
due to the beneficiary or to the persons assuming their support.

(c) The payment shall be in either a lump sum or in monthly amounts.

(d) The total of the payments made under this section shall fully discharge and release the office from any further claims.

(2) A beneficiary who qualifies for a monthly benefit under this section shall apply in writing to the office.

(3) The allowance shall begin on the first day of the month following the month in which the:

(a) member or participant died, if the application is received by the office within 90 days of the date of death of the
member or participant; or

Gill)

(b) application is received by the office, if the application is received by the office more than 90 days after the date of
death of the member or participant.
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Credits
Laws 1987, c. 1, § 26; Laws 1997, c. 31, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2002, c. 250, § 33, eff. March 26, 2002; Laws 2014, c.
15, § 6, eff. March 3, 2014.

Codifications C. 1953, § 49-1-607.

U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-610, UT ST§ 49-11-610
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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ADDENDUME

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CASE HISTORY

DIANE WELTY
Plaintiff,

Ci
vs.

Case No: 120902041 MP

MARY ELLEN LOPEZ

Judge:

Defendant.

Date:

RICHARD MCKELVIE
Dec. 08, 2014

CASE DISPOSITION
09/19/2012 Dismissed by Judge RICHARD MCKELVIE
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